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Article 8

Comment

Medical Malpractice in Perspective:
Nebraska Hospital-Medical
Liability Act
I.

INTRODUCT[ON

In the early through mid-1970's, the health care industry in many
states faced a serious medical malpractice crisis.1 It was characterized by an enormous increase in the number of malpractice
claims; 2 a significant increase in the amount of damages awarded
to prevailing patients;3 a serious decline in the availability of malpractice insurance;4 a dramatic rise in premiums demanded by
those companies which continued to issue policies;5 an alarming
1. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMUiaSSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,

1-4

(HEW Pub. No. (OS) 73-88, 1973) [hereinafter cited as MALPRACTICE REPORT].
See alsoABA

COMMSSION ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIAnxry,

1977

REPORT

[hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT]; Blaut, The Medical Crisis-Its Causes
and Future,44 INs. COUNSEL J. 114 (1977); Redish, Legislative Response to the
Medical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: ConstitutionalImplications, 55 TEx.
L. REV. 759 (1977); Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A
First Checkup, 50 TuL. L. REv. 655 (1976).
2. See MALAC'TICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-8; Abraham, MedicalMalpractice
Reform: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 36 MD. L REV. 489,490-91 (1977). See also T.
LOmBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 1-81 (1978).

3. See Witherspoon, Constitutionalityof the Texas Statute Limiting Liability
for Medical Malpractice,10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 419, 446 n.123 (1979); Federal
MedicalMalpracticeInsuranceAct HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Health
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 161
(1975).
4. See Redish, supra note 1, at 759-60. See generally Gibbs, Insurance Crisis:
Availability to PhysiciansIn Jeopardy,J. LEGAL MED., Feb., 1975, at 29; Gray,
The Insurer'sDilemma, 51 IND. L.J. 120 (1975); Roddis & Stewart, The Insurance of Medical Losses, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1281.
5.
The increase in medical malpractice insurance rates for physicians,
brought about by increases in both the number of claims and the average value of those claims, has been as much as fivefold from 1965
through 1974. By mid-1975 rate levels for physicians and surgeons
professional liability insurance in some states were more than 100
per cent higher than 1974 levels.
Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 427-28 n43. See also Redish, supra note 1, at
759-60; Segar, Is MalpracticeInsurable?,51 IND. L.J. 128 (1975).
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trend toward defensive medical practices 6 and away from high-risk
specialization; 7 and a: continual rise in costs to patients. 8 These
problems were pervasive: "[TIhe problem touches every facet of
our health-care delivery system. Costs, patterns of medical practice and forms of medical treatment, the distribution of health
manpower, the relationships between doctors and patients, even
confidence in equal justice before the law-all of these and more
are affected by the problem." 9
Nebraska, like many other states, responded to the crisis with
legislation. The Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act,' 0 enacted in 1976, significantly alters the substantive and procedural
rules relating to medical malpractice actions. This comment will
examine both the malpractice crisis and Nebraska's legislative response. First, the history of the malpractice crisis and its causes
will be evaluated in an effort to discern whether Nebraska's broad
legislation was truly necessary. Then, the Nebraska Act will be analyzed in some detail, with comparisons to similar statutes from
other states, and discussions of the Nebraska Supreme Court decision upholding the Act, Prendergastv. Nelson." Alternatives to
the Nebraska approach will be considered throughout.
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Suits for medical malpractice 12 were rare 13 before 1930.14 IndiSee notes 111-16 & accompanying text infra.
See note 109 & accompanying text infra.
See text accompanying note 114 infra.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to -2855 (Reissue 1978).
199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). Numerous constitutional challenges to
medical malpractice legislation have been equally unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); State ex rel. Schneider
v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610, 576 P.2d 221 (1978); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256
(La. 1978); Attorney General v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (Ct. App.),
appealdismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985
(Mass. 1977). But see Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347
N.E.2d 736 (1976); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,
355 N.E.2d 903 (1976); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
12. Malpractice has been defined as "a dereliction from professional duty
whether intentional, criminal, or merely negligent by one rendering professional services that results in injury, loss, or damage to the recipient of those
WEBSTER's THiRD NEW
services or to those entitled to rely upon them ......
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1368 (unabr. ed. 1971). See W. PRosSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 161-66 (4th ed. 1971); McCoid, The Care
Required of Medical Practitioners,12 VAND. L REv. 549 (1959). See also
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1111 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) (malpractice: "Any professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in professional or
fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct.").
13. It may still be true that suits or claims for malpractice are relatively rare in
comparison to the number of incidents of malpractice. A 1978 Rand Corpora6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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viduals accepted sickness and death as inevitable, and dissatisfied
patients rarely looked to the courts for satisfaction: "[M] edicine
itself was comparatively limited and adverse results of treatment
more often than not were either regarded as the natural outcome
of disease or attributed to 'the will of God.' ,1"
In the 1930's noticeable increases in the number of malpractice
suits occurred in several states, but these suits declined in the period just prior to World War H.16 However, in the post-World War
I1 era, the number of malpractice suits steadily increased, 17 an upward spiral that culminated in the malpractice crisis we experienced in the early seventies. The following section explores the
most commonly suggested reasons for this dramatic increase.
A.

The Causes

Unfortunately, there are no definitive explanations for the dramatic increase1 8 in malpractice claims and actions although numerous theories have been offered. Then too, the seriousness of
the crisis often depended on an individual's perspective. 9 Contrasting theories, statistics and studies abounded at the height of
the crisis which only fueled the flames of accusation. The malpractice situation was
a vicious circle [in which] physicians, attorneys and insurance companies
blame[d] one another for creating and aggravating the problem. Physicians criticize[d] attorneys for abusing the contingent fee system; both
groups berate[d] insurers for having impersonal philosophies. The medical profession itself was attacked by attorneys, insurers and patients for
its diminishing physician-patient rapport and for permitting malpractice
misadventures.20

Although there was little hard quantitative evidence, 2 1 all par-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

tion Study concluded that only one out of every ten apparent incidents of
malpractice ever result in a claim. MALPRACTICE DIG., Jan./Feb. 1979, at 4. See
also MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-3, 12; Stewart, The Malpractice
Problem-ItsCause and Cure: The Physician'sPerspective, 51 IND. UJ. 134,
134 (1975); notes 360-64 & accompanying text infra.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
"[T] here is no uniquely identifiable 'malpractice problem,' but rather, a complex of problems involving interacting medical, legal, sociological, psychological, and economic factors." MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
Some commentators believe that there was no true malpractice crisis. See,
e.g., Witherspoon, supra note 3.
9 IND. I REV. 594, 595 (1976).
See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. See also MALPRACTICE IN Focus, AN AMA SOuRCE DocuMdENT 11 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MALPRACTICE
IN Focus] ("Millions of words already have been addressed to the malpractice crisis, sometimes numbing the brain and obscuring core issues. Unfortu-
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ties continued to point their fingers and attribute the blame to anyone, and everyone, but themselves. Certainly the rhetoric and
speculation impeded the search for a viable solution.
When analyzing the malpractice issue in perspective it is apparent that a myriad of medical, legal, social and economic factors created the problem. No single villain caused the crisis and no simple

panacea will solve

it.22

1. Legal Causes
23
a. Contingent Fees
A lively controversy surrounds this system of attorney compensation.2 4 Health care providers accuse greedy attorneys of instigating vexatious litigation. They believe that "contingent fees prompt
lawyers to pursue claims of dubious merit in the hope of securing a
large verdict from a sympathetic jury, and to seek irresponsibly
high recoveries for legitimate claims." 25 These arguments have
merit because a health care provider may not contest a small claim
since malpractice litigation involves extensive costs. 26 Moreover,
health care providers may frequently settle what they perceive to
be nuisance suits primarily to avoid needless vexation. This praclitigation according to
tice only encourages additional unnecessary
27
the critics of the contingent fee system.
However, the evidence indicates that the contingent fee system
does not overcompensate plaintiffs' attorneys for their legal services. One extensive study found that plaintiffs' attorneys are compensated fairly for their services (an average of $63 an hour in
1973) and that defense attorneys earned roughly the same amount
($50 an hour).28 Furthermore, attorneys reject the majority of po-

22.
23.

24.

25.
26.
27.
28.

nately, reliable up-to-date information on the full extent of the problem has
been sadly lacking."); Abraham, supra note 2, at 532.
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 15; Comment, supra note 1, at 655-59.
A contingent fee is that amount which the attorney and client stipulate will
be paid to an attorney for his services only if he wins. Generally this is a
percentage of the amount recovered. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 740-41 (rev.
4th ed. 1968). See generally F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES (1964).
See, e.g., MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33; Schwartz & Mitchell, An
Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970); Stewart, supra note 13, at 138-39; Comment, supra
note 1, at 670.
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DuKE L.J. 1417, 1443.
See Mechanic, Some Social Aspects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1182-83.
Id. at 1183. But see note 110 infra (health care providers have fought this
trend with various types of counter-suits).
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33.
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tential medical malpractice claims because these actions involve
many inherent risks. 29 The contingent fee system discourages
most attorneys from accepting meritless and small claims since
they may invest a significant amount of time but receive little or no
recovery. 30 Proponents also claim that without it, individuals with
meritorious claims but insufficient resources would be unable to
pursue meaningfully any remedy, since few qualified attorneys
would be willing to work for a client who was unable to pay for
their services. 31 The contingent fee system allows the client to
pursue a claim but avoid the often crippling burden of legal expenses, 32 a particularly relevant factor in light of the inordinate
length of the typical malpractice trial.3 3 Nevertheless, health care
providers have persuaded the state legislatures to adopt various
methods of regulating legal fees.3 4
b.

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Critics point to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a prime example of procedural discretion which places the health care provider or hospital at a distinct disadvantage.3 5 Interpreted as "the
thing speaks for itself", res ipsa loquitur is an evidentary rule that
creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was negligent. There are three conditions which are usually necessary for
the application of the principle: (1) an injury occurs which is of
the type that ordinarily does not occur except for someone's negligence, (2) the agency or instrument which caused the injury must
have been within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3)
29. One national survey revealed that the plaintiffs' attorneys accept only 12% of
the claims reviewed. MALPRACTICE DIG., Sept./Oct. 1978, at 2. As one commentator noted:
The fact is that a malpractice case is by far the riskiest type of legal
action undertaken today... The risk in time and money of begin-

ning a frivolous malpractice action is simply too great. Attorneys
who specialize in medical malpractice turn away the substantial majority of potential clients who walk into their office alleging injury at
the hands of a physician.
MALPRACTICE LiELmE, Aug. 28, 1978, at 3 (quoting Alan Y. Medvin).
30. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33. Half of the attorneys who win
a malpractice suit on a one-third contingent fee basis earn less than $1,000.
Id. at 34.
31. Comment, supra note 25, at 1442.
32. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 35; Abraham, supra note 2, at 491;
Mallor, A Curefor Plaintiffs Ills?, 51 IND.LJ. 103, 105-06 (1975).

33. Most malpractice suits take from four to five years to resolve. MALPRACTICE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
34. See notes 219-31 & accompanying text infra.
35. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-29; Comment, supra note 25, at
1426-29.
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the plaintiff must be free of any contributory negligence. 3 6
The medical profession anticipates that this doctrine may be invoked in all malpractice cases in order to force health care providers to carry the burden of proof and demonstrate that they were
not negligent.37 However, this doctrine applies infrequently in
medical malpractice actions, and is not allowed to substitute for
proof where the allegations involve specific acts of negligence. 38
For instance, res ipsa loquitur applies when foreign objects are left
in the patient's body after surgery39 or when the patient suffers
unexplained injuries during the course of surgery. 40 The application of the doctrine to these limited situations 41 is justified on the
theory that the defendants are in a much better position than the
patient to explain the injury.42
c. Jury Verdicts
Health care providers charge that juries are frequently influ36. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 39, at 214. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486,
489-90, 154 P.2d 687, 689 (1944).
37. Comment, supra note 25, at 1426. However, this does not appear to be applicable in Nebraska. See, e.g., Kortus v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261, 237 N.W.2d 845
(1976).
[P]roof of medical negligence (malpractice) requires two basic evidentiary steps, followed by proof relating to proximate cause and
damages: (1) Evidence of the generally accepted and recognized
standard of care ... ; and (2) a showing that the physician or surgeon inquestion negligently departed from that standard in his treatment of the plaintiff. The burden of establishing both these essential
elements rests upon the plaintiff's introduction of expert medical testimony. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable here.
Id. at 268, 237 N.W.2d at 850 (emphasis in original).
38. MALPRAcTIcE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
39. Id. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 39, at 227-28.
40. For a collection of cases addressing this issue, see W. PROSSE, supra note 12,
§ 39, at 227-28 nn.4-9. The leading case applying the res ipsa doctrine is
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), a case in which the
court held the application of res ipsa was proper where the patient received
unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment
by numerous health care providers.
41. It appears, however, that application of the doctrine may be expanding. The
HEW Commission found that in the period prior to 1950, res ipsa was considered in only 6.3% of the cases, but in the period from 1961-1971 it was considered in 13.4% of the cases. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
Additionally, res ipsa has been expanded in California to include "rare-accident" cases. Id. at 28. See, e.g., Clark v. Gibbons, 66 Cal. 2d 399, 426 P.2d 525
(1967); Quintal v. Laurel Grove Hosp., 62 Cal. 2d 154, 397 P.2d 161 (1964). In
response to this trend some states have enacted statutes which require proof
by the plaintiff of the health care provider's negligence, which in essence,
negates the res ipsa doctrine. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3414 (Cum.
Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1978).
42. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
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enced by clever attorneys who capitalize on the complex and frequently gruesome nature of a malpractice case. Moreover, juries
may express sympathy towards the patient and prejudice towards
the health care provider 4 3 based on their own experiences with, or
perceptions of, the medical profession. 44 The medical profession
accuses juries of increasing the cost of malpractice insurance because when juries are used, they are time consuming and their verdicts are unpredictable.4 5 And, although these charges are not

unique to the jury system, "they are especially pertinent in the
medical malpractice area because of the increasing number of

claims, the sensitivity and technical complexity of that area, and

the large dollar amounts at stake."4 6
Although the data is inconclusive, 47 malpractice litigation in all
likelihood confuses many jurors since it involves complex terminology, concepts and expert testimony.4 8 To address this problem
some commentators have suggested adjustments in the roles of
judges and juries in medical malpractice litigation. 4 9 The legislatures have responded with various alternatives, such as requiring
preliminary review by a medical review panel,5 0 or substituting arbitration panels 51 for the jury in malpractices cases. These meas43. Segar, supra note 5, at 140.
44. Anger, revenge, hostility and resentment towards health care providers are
frequently suggested as the key ingredients leading to malpractice actions.
The impersonality of the doctor/patient relationship frustrates and angers
the patient. Many health care providers are perceived as "arrogant, egotistical, condescending, [and] aloof." MALPRACTICE LIFELNE, July 24, 1978, at 5.
Moreover, many individuals may share these feelings even if they have had
no misfortunes personally, so potential bias against the medical profession
may exist at the outset of the proceedings. For an excellent analysis of why
many health care providers attract the public's wrath, see R. GoTs, THE
TRuTH ABoT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 14-19 (1975). But see Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward Medical Malpractice,reprinted in
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 658 (Appendix).
45. Comment, supra note 25, at 1455. Additional factors that impede settlements
are "the defendant/physician's right to refuse settlement, a tendency of malpractice insurers to wait until the last minute before trial to settle, a lack of
lawyer preparation, the long walt to trial, plaintiffs' demand for jury trial, unreasonably high award demands, and ineffective pretrial procedures." Id. at
1455 n.188.
46. Id. at 1455.
47. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
48. Id.
49. Abraham, supra note 2, at 508-12.
50. Id. at 512. See notes 267-352 & accompanying text infra.
51. An arbitration panel can be distinguished from a screening panel in that the
former vests full decision-making power in the hands of non-judicial arbitrators selected by the parties. Arbitration resolves all claims at this stage, thus
avoiding any need for a trial Screening panels, however, are intended only to
encourage settlement of meritless claims, without eliminating the partys'
rights to proceed to trial. See Redish, supra note 1, at 768-69, 796-800; Coin-
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ures are intended to minimize the number of cases which
ultimately must be tried by a jury by resolving disputes at the earliest possible stages.
d.

Meritless Litigation

Most health care providers are convinced that they are unjustly
harassed by the legal profession. 5 2 Lawyers are seen as
profiteers, 53 who needlessly persecute health care providers, often
second-guessing their action and initiating unnecessary malpractice actionsM In one national survey, for instance, physicians
caused the malpractice situation
stated that aggressive attorneys
55
to deteriorate significantly.
It appears, however, that most lawyers not only do not actively
pursue malpractice work but persistently avoid it.56 The primary
reasons for this are that traditional malpractice suits 57 are excep-

52.

53.
54.

55.

56.

57.

merit, supra note 25, at 1463-67. The advantages and disadvantages of various
methods of arbitration are discussed in MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 91-96. See generally MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 214-449 (Appendix) (extensive studies on various medical malpractice arbitration panels).
Pabst, A Medical Opinion Survey of Physicians'Attitudes on Medical Malpractice,reprinted in MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 83 (Appendix);
Rathnau, The Illinois Medical Malpractice Acts: Response to Crisis, 65 ILL.
B.J. 716, 720 (1977).
39 Omo ST. L.J. 855, 859 (1978).
California has recently enacted legislation to minimize the potential for meritless litigation. See CAL. CirV. PRO. CODE § 411.30 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
This provision provides that in all cases involving claims of medical malpractice, the plaintiff's attorney must fie a certificate of merit which states that
the attorney believes, after reviewing the facts and consulting with qualified
individuals in the health care industry, that there is a "reasonable and meritorious cause for filing such action." A violation of this provision may constitute unprofessional conduct and represent grounds for disciplining the
attorney.
Pabst, supra note 52, at 84. The physicians indicated their belief that the
most significant contributing factors of the crisis are: (1) poor communication between physician and patient; (2) aggressive lawyers; (3) declining
public regard for doctors; (4) increasing complexity of medical practice; (5)
increasing public education about medicine; (6) just plain "bad medicine";
(7) the current system of patient care; (8) poorly-trained physicians; and (9)
miscellaneous reasons. Id.
See note 29 supra. (Only 12% of malpractice claims reviewed are accepted);
Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, reprinted in
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 87, 99-101 (Appendix); Committee on
Health & Welfare: Hearingson L.B. 434, 84th Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. 100 (Jan. 27,
1976) (remarks of David Lathrup). But see Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1184
(lawyers are more willing to accept malpractice work, and firms are specializing in this area); Comment, supra note 1, at 658 (large numbers of plaintiffs'
attorneys have become proficient at litigating malpractice claims).
A traditional malpractice trial involves all the procedural elements and steps
of a typical civil action. The major disadvantages to such procedures in the
malpractice context are discussed in Documentary Supplement, Medical-Le-
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tionally complex,58 time consuming 9 and expensive. 60 Furthermore, since the attorney's fee is often contingent upon winning,
the attorney may expend tremendous time and effort on a case for
which he receives no compensation. 61
2. Medical Causes
a. TechnologicalAdvances
Medical science throughout the last several decades has advanced at an astronomical pace. Pioneering research has developed extremely sophisticated machinery which has enabled the
medical profession to save countless lives and substantially reduce
unnecessary suffering. Unfortunately, these achievements are not
without inevitable risks: "New drugs, new techniques and new
machinery bring with them new risks, and no degree of professional competence and training can guarantee a successful outcome in every medical case. Medicine ...

,

for all its widely-

heralded accomplishments, is still more art than science." 62 Since
the technology today is so exceptionally complex, human error,
even when the health care provider is fully competent and exercises all the necessary precautions, carries the potential for serious, or perhaps disastrous, consequences. 63 Adverse results,
regardless of the degree of care, may be an inevitable consequence
of medical treatment. Although the health care provider's conduct
may not be negligent, a patient who has come to expect only the
best results may seek compensation for unsatisfactory results
even though his injury has little merit as a claim for malpractice.
This in turn increases the court congestion and expenses in defending meritless suits.
Along with the tremendous growth in medical technology has
gal Screening Panels as an Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice
Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L REV.695, 709-10 (1972).
58. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18 (emphasis added):

Medical malpractice cases are among the most difficult to try.
They usually take from two to three times longerthan other personal
injury cases because of the complexity of the requisite expert medical testimony. Thus, although few in total number, they contribute
significantly to the congestion and overload of the court system.
59. See note 33 supra.
60. Abraham, supra note 2, at 491; Mallor, supra note 32, at 105.
61. This appears to be a very real possibility. For instance, in the MALPRACTiCE
REPORT study it was discovered that "the average number of plaintiff-lawyer
hours spent in zero-recovery litigated cases is 440 hours per case." MAL'nAcTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33.
62. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1. See also ABA REPORT, supra note 1,

at 11.
63. Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1181.
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come increased medical specialization 64 which undoubtedly has
generated more malpractice litigation. For instance, anesthesiologists and health care providers involved in particularly hazardous
types of surgery (orthepedic, gyneocological and gastrointestinal)
are subject to a greater number of malpractice claims due to the
higher risks involved in their procedures. 65 Additionally, the
larger number of professional and non-professional personnel involved in the treatment process 66 increases the potential for a malpractice incident because with more health care providers
involved, the potential for communication and follow-up error increases. Also, the direct communication between physician and
patient decreases, which hinders the development of any rapport.

67

b.

Heightened Public Expectations

Primarily as a result of these medical advances, the public now
expects near faultlessness from the medical profession. Patients
often "believe that physicians can cure any disease, save the life
and health of any patient, and correct any kind of physical de68
fect.,'
Much of this illusion can be attributed to the news media,
which often emphasizes dramatic accomplishments while neglecting to discuss the inherent risks and limitations involved in many
aspects of medical treatment.69 The public is often led to believe
miracles are possible when in reality acceptable cures are only in
the experimental stages. 70 The broadcast industry likewise portrays the medical profession in a false light, i.e., one which indicates that no problem is unsurmountable. 7 ' The results of such
falsehoods are exaggerated expectations of the medical profes64. Id.
65. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9; Comment, supra note 1, at 657.

See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS, vol. 2,No. 1, at 26-31 (tables 6-9a), 66-109 (tables 13a-d) (1979) [hereinafter cited as NAIC STUDY]. For an excellent statistical breakdown of the
numbers and types of medical injuries and the amount of indemnity paid
compared to the number of physicians and hospital beds in each state, see id.
(tables 28a-d).
66.
67.
68.
69.

ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1183-84.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 70.
Id. at 70. News coverage of medical achievements should be compared with
the sensational news coverage sometimes afforded the medical malpractice
area. See id. at 18-19. See also Byrnes, Media and Medical Malpractice,reprinted in MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 653 (Appendix).
70. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 70.
71. Id.
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sion. 72 The public becomes desensitized to the inevitable risks of
medical treatment, and our expectations of the medical profession
often exceed that which the profession can deliver. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare Commission on Medical
Malpractice recognized this problem, finding that the "expectations of patients concerning the technical capabilities of medicine
are often exaggerated and unrealistic. There is a need to educate
all patients concerning the hazards, risks, costs and limitations of
medicine in order to reduce disappointment, frustration, and dissatisfaction with the outcome of treatment." 73 Patients are often
bitter when the results of medical care do not measure up to their
prior notions, and this dissatisfaction is expressed in the form of
malpractice litigation. 74 Many patients simply are no longer willing to overlook errors in diagnosis or treatment.7 5 They are prehold the health care
pared to question procedures and results 7and
6
provider liable for adverse consequences.
c. Poor CommunicationsBetween Health Care Providersand
Patients
A significant amount of data7 7 and commentary78 illustrates

that poor communications between the health care provider and
the patient greatly increases the number of malpractice actions. 79
A malpractice suit may reflect much more than mere dissatisfaction with the quality of service rendered.8 0 It may represent an
expression of anger and resentment directed at the health care
72. Id.; ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
73. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 70.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1185.
R. GoTS, supra note 44, at 15.
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
See, e.g., note 55 supra.

78. See, e.g., MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 67, 71; MALPRACTICE DIG.,

Jan./Feb. 1979, at 2-3. For a general background discussion of how a lack of
understanding between the health care prbvider and patient can result in
malpractice litigation, see 1 D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAms, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

15

(1977) [hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & WILLiAms].

79. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 11, 22.
80. But see MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2 (footnote omitted):
To the vast majority of patients, malpractice may seem no problem at all. They receive high quality care and they are satisfied with
it. The thought of suing their doctors or hospitals never enters their
minds. Most doctors and other health care providers go through
their entire professional lives without being sued. Most large hospitals in any given year treat thousands of patients, none of whom
sues.
See also MALPRACTICE LIFELINE, Nov. 21, 1977, at 1 (Ohio study concudes that

87% of consumers rate the quality of care they receive from their doctors as
excellent or good, and more than 90% have great confidence in their doctors).
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provider or hospital involved. 81 Many patients regard health care
providers as greedy, condescending and impersonal, factors which
indicate deterioration in the relationships between the health care
provider and the patient.82 One study concluded that physicians
who are likely to be sued frequently are those who are unable to
admit their own limitations in training or experience; who neglect
or dismiss a dissatisfied patient; who are preoccupied with their
personal images and unconcerned with their patients' anxieties or
anger; and who are totally indifferent towards the personal and
psychological needs of their patients. 83 Health care providers are
largely responsible for this poor image and resulting breakdown in
communication because they have learned to rely on their complex technology, but they have at the same time "largely forgotten
the art of medicine and dealing with patients. '84 The relationship
between the health care provider and the patients is frequently depersonalized and characterized by inadequate communication. A
patient who is unable to communicate with the health care provider will resort to other means to vent his frustrations, and the
evidence seems to indicate clearly that this frequently means
seeking legal redress: 85 "If understanding between physician and
patient is not commensurate with the necessary diagnostic and
therapeutic activities, there is a strong possibility of a failure of
treatment, collapse of the relationship, or both. If both
occur at
86
about the same time chances for a lawsuit are strong."
81. Anxiety and frustration, however, may be inevitable during a hospital visit,
even under the best circumstances. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at
69-70.
82. See, e.g., Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1183-84; Peterson, supra note 44, at 658;
MALPRACTICE IFELine, Dec. 5, 1977, at 3.
83. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 68.
84. R. GOTS, supra note 44, at 15. However, patients likewise must bear a good
deal of the responsibility for the breakdown in communications. Certainly
many patients maintain unrealistic attitudes towards health care providers
and medicine. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 68. Moreover, many are
"dogmatic" and quick to blame others when results are unsatisfactory. Id.
Enhanced communications are certainly a two-way street and patients must
realize that they also have responsibilities in this regard. See MALPRACTICE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 70 (special programs suggested to educate the public
on various aspects of medicine); ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-24 (check
list of patient responsibilities for improved physician-patient relations and
health care).
85. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 22; note 44 supra.
86. 1 LOuiSELL & WnIIrAJs, supra note 78, 15.02, at 137 (footnote omitted). But a
malpractice suit is a relatively rare occurrence. In 1970, for instance, a malpractice incident was alleged or reported for only one out of every 158,000
patient visits to doctors, and a claim was asserted for only one out of every
226,000 patient visits. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. But see notes
360-64 & accompanying text infra (evidence indicates that malpractice occurs
much more frequently than reported).
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Coupled with this breakdown in relations between the health
care provider and the patient, medical consumers today are aware
of their legal rights and are willing to utilize available legal channels to resolve problems. This escalating trend toward suit and
substantially increases the potential for malclaims consciousness
87
practice actions.
3. Insurance Nightmares
As a consequence of the substantial increase in the number of
claims, the amount of the awards, 8 8 and the "long tail" 89 associated
with malpractice occurrences, insurance rate-making during this
period became an "actuarial nightmare." 90 It was difficult to develop accurate malpractice insurance rates for several reasons.
First, the medical malpractice market was extremely small. 91
Moreover, the rapid increase in the number of claims and their av-

erage cost made it difficult to pinpoint any predictable pattern. 92

Finally, a substantial period of time must elapse before the ratemaker can predict with any degree of certainty what the experi87. 1 LOUISELL & Wmnuis, supra note 78, 5.09; ALxPRACTICE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 25; Stewart, supra note 13, at 134.
88. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5-12; Gray, supra note 4, at 121;
Redish, supra note 1, at 760-61.
89. The "long tail" is the period during which the insurance company may be
held accountable for the malpractice of the insured physician occurring during the time the policy is in effect. Comment, supra note 1, at 659 n.28. Explanations for this "long tail" include congestion in the courts, lengthy
preparation time for both plaintiff and defense attorneys, and strategic (perhaps unnecessary) delays by both parties. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note
1, at 42. Furthermore, medical injuries are unique in that the injury may not
become apparent until years after the incident which caused the injury. Id.
In many instances, the incidence of malpractice is not discovered by the patient until five or six years after the occurrence, and only 38% of all actions
for medical malpractice are fied within a two year period following the malpractice incident upon which they are based. Continuing Med. Malpractice
Ins. Crisis: HearingsBefore Subcomm on Health, Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at 192 (Dec. 3, 1975). In response to this
situation most insurance companies began to issue only "claims made" policies which pay all malpractice liability on any claim made while the policy is
in effect regardless of when the negligence occurred. Comment, supra note 1,
at 659 n.28. See generally Redish, supra note 1; Roddis & Stewart, supra note
4;Steves, A Proposalto Improve the Cost to Benefit Relationshipsin the Medical ProfessionalLiability Insurance System, 1975 DuxE LJ. 1305; Note, The
"Claims Made" Dilemma in Professional Liability Insurance,22 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 925 (1975).
90. Comment, supra note 1, at 659. See also Segar, supra note 5, at 130-31; Note,
Introduction"The IndianaAct in Context, 51 IND.L. 91, 95 (1975). See generally Kendall & Holdi, The Medical Malpractice InsuranceMarke reprinted
in MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 494 (Appendix).
91. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
92. Id.
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ence has been 93 because it takes an inordinate amount of time to
settle a malpractice claim. 94 In addition, during the crisis, the
number of claims paid and the amount paid on each of these
claims increased rapidly and unpredictably.9 5 For instance, if a
company's average cost per claim9 6 throughout a five-year period
amounted to $2,000, but suddenly a $500,000 award was paid,9 the
7
figures were no longer reliable for the purposes of projection.
Essentially, although the insurance premiums that were calculated in the late 1960's and early 1970's were adequate at the time,
they were grossly inadequate to satisfy the tremendous increase in
claims and awards several years later.9 8 Rate-making became a
financial risk which insurers were increasingly reluctant to assume.9 9 Since intelligent rate-making was virtually impossible, insurers simply discontinued writing policies. 00
The Costs

B.

The abrupt increase in the number of medical malpractice
claims and suits exacted tremendous economic and psychological
costs from the insurance industry, the health care industry and the
public.' 0 '
1.

Insurance Premiums

Although medical malpractice insurance is generally consid93.
94.
95.
96.

97.
98.
99.

100.

101.

Id. at 42.
See note 33 supra.
See Redish, supra note 1, at 759-63.
This would include costs for all claims since defending these claims completely through the appeals stage would amount to a substantial expense.
These cases are quite simply "expensive to try and expensive to settle."
Comment, supra note 1, at 659-60 n.29.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
Comment, supra note 1, at 659.
See Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 427-28 n.43. For an excellent chart indicating how each state medical association assessed the availability of malpractice coverage in July of 1975, see MALPRACTICE iN Focus, supra note 21, at 1820. See also Gibbs, supra note 4; Roddis & Stewart, supra note 4.
See Note, supra note 90, at 92-94. But see NAIC STUDY, supra note 65, at 144
(table 26) (extensive list of insurers currently writing medical malpractice
insurance). Some commentators have argued that the abruptness with
which the insurance industry abandoned the malpractice field was unnecessary and was based primarily on feelings of insecurity rather than an actual
crisis. MALPRACnCE LIFELINE, Jan. 29, 1979, at 8. This action precipitated the
panic. Id. But though the insurance industry was to blame for the initial miscalculations and perhaps for the speed with which they elected to substantially curtail or discontinue writing malpractice coverage, it appears that their
financial losses were significant. See Segar, supra note 5, at 130-31. See generally MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38-40.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20.
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ered indispensable to the medical profession, it was not generally
available except at tremendously inflated prices. 0 2 For instance,
in the period from 1960 to 1970, premiums for physicians other than
surgeons rose 540.8%1o 03 and those for surgeons increased
05
949.2%;104 hospital premiums increased 262.7% in this period,
1
0
6
and 196% from 1974-1975 alone.
As a result, many physicians
passed these increased costs on to their patients 0 7 and many
elected to "go bare," i.e., carry little or no insurance coverage. 108 In
the areas hardest hit by the crisis, some physicians quit practicing
or moved into government, research or teaching positions where
there was minimal exposure to suit. 0 9 Many physicians, however,
initiated countersuits which further magnified the problem and in102. See Redish, supra note 1, at 760 n.4, MALPRACTICE INFocus, supra note 21, at
18-19. See also note 5 supra.
103. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. MALPRACTICE LIFELINE, Aug. 28, 1978, at 1. But by 1977 the crisis had peaked,

and it was generally recognized that there was no serious problem in any
state with respect to the availability or cost of medical malpractice insurance.
See Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 448; MALPRACTICE DIGEST, Jan./Feb. 1979,

at 3-6.
107. See text accompanying note 127 infra.
108. Going bare was used to a much greater extent in those states with the highest
premiums. For instance, in California it was estimated that approximately
20% of the physicians were going bare during the crisis. MALPRAcTacE LIFELINE, Mar. 14, 1977, at 1. However, it seems clear that going bare exacts a tre-

mendous price from the physician who lives in constant anxiety of a potential
suit and consequently practices cautiously, often refusing to perform a procedure for fear of potential adverse results. MALPRACTICE LIFEL NE, Oct. 24,

1977, at 4. This is because a physician practicing without insurance endangers all his personal assets everytime he treats a patient. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.

In response to the number of physicians going bare, some states refuse to
issue a license to practice medicine unless the health care provider has sufficient malpractice insurance. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3402 (Cum. Supp.
1979) (every health care provider, as a condition to rendering services in the
state of Kansas must maintain a policy of professional liability insurance approved by the commissioner of insurance). The provision was found to be
constitutional in State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett, 223 Kan. 610, 576 P.2d 221
(1978). See also Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.40-330 (Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1301.701 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80); Muranaka, Compulsory Medical MalpracticeInsurance Statutes: An Approach in Determining Constitutionality,
12 U.S.F. L. REv. 599 (1978).
109. See MALPRACTICE IN Focus, supra note 21, at 11. But see MALPRACTICE LIFE-

Mar. 14, 1977, at 1-2, in which a Rand Corporation study indicates that in
California, one of the states with the most severe medical malpractice
problems during the crisis, malpractice was neither driving physicians from
the state nor discouraging new physicians from the setting up practice.
Rather, health care providers were passing their costs onto their patients, or
changing the scope of their practice to lower their premiums.
LINE,
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creased the costs. 110
2. Defensive Medicine
Health care providers practice defensive medicine by altering
their method of practice for two reasons: to diminish the potential
for lawsuits by their patients, and to provide a good legal defense
in the event such lawsuits are instituted."' Defensive medicine
may involve excessive use of x-rays, diagnostic procedures, laboratory tests and patient visits, and may include unnecessary or extended hospitalization. 1 2 Although the data is inconclusive, as
many as fifty to seventy percent of physicians claim they practice
110. Many health care providers have responded to the malpractice crisis with
countersuits based on charges of malicious prosecution, defamation of character and abuse of process. See Birnbaum, PhysiciansCounterattack--Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45
FORDHAM L REv. 1003 (1977); Note, Physician Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution, Defamation and Abuse of ProcessAs Remedies for Meritless Medical
Malpractice Suits, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 604 (1976). Since many claims have a
certain amount of merit, these actions have had only a minimal impact on the
malpractice problem, i.e., they have not reduced the number of claims which
are made. See MALPRACTICE LIFELINE, June 25, 1979, at 4-8 (chart summarizing the results of most physician's countersuits throughout the nation). In
addition, several recent cases seem to indicate that medical malpractice
countersuits will only rarely be successful. See Ammerman v. Newman, 384
A.2d 637 (D.C. 1978) (attorney defendant was properly granted summary
judgment in a malicious prosecution action); Umansky v. Urquhart, 84 Cal.
App. 3d 368, 148 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1978) (abuse of process countersuit could not
serve as the basis of a claim); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, 381 N.E.2d
1367 (1978) (physician failed to establish the required elements for a malicious prosecution case because his alleged injuries were common to all malpractice actions).
At least one legislature has given health care providers a cause of action
for instigating a bad faith suit. See TEX. REv. Cirv. STAT. ANN., art. 4590i, § 8.02.04 (Vernon Supp. 1980). See also Chambers, Physician Recovery for Bad
Faith Medical Malpractice Actions, 10 TEx. TECH L REV. 391 (1979); Holloway, Malicious ProsecutionActions by the Medical Profession againstAttorneys Who Unsuccessfully Pursue a MedicalMalpracticeSuitfor a Patient,41
TEx. B.J. 421 (1978). For a general discussion of malicious prosecution,
wrongful use of civil procedure and abuse of process, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 653-74 (1977).
111. See Bernzweig, Defensive Medicine, reprinted in MALPRACTcE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 38 (Appendix). One study classifies this type of medicine in
two categories: (1) positive defensive medicine, where the health care provider uses diagnostic treatment procedures excessively, perhaps even unnecessarily, and (2) negative defensive medicine where the health care provider
refuses to undertake a course of action because of fear of potential liability,
even though the patient is likely to benefit from the procedure or treatment.
See Project, The MedicalMalpracticeThreat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DuKE L.J. 939, 942, 948-49.
112. Bernzweig, supra note 111, at 38-39.
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defensive medicine in one form or another." 3 The result is a substantial increase in the costs of medicine to consumers.1 1 4 Moreover, the patient is subjected to additional, often unnecessary,
procedures and the physician is unable to render the highest quality of care:115 "[Defensive medicine's] unfortunate manifestations
include the replacement of medical judgment by legal considerations, discouragement of innovations in medical practice, and the
resulting impairment of medical progress. Under a defense
medicine climate, research
tends to become stereotyped, and inge6
nuity is discouraged.""
3. Emotional Distress
The costs of medical malpractice are not measured merely in
economic terms, but in psychological and emotional terms as
well." 7 Health care providers, for instance, are typically stigmatized by the threat of a potential lawsuit." 8 As one commentator
noted
[T] he emotional trauma of being sued is indescribable, because one's professional conduct and competence are in question.... In addition, there
is the realization that a finding of negligence could theoretically result in
the loss of one's license to practice
medicine or damage to a physician's
reputation that is beyond repair. 119

Moreover, a health care provider may experience adverse
financial effects since the lawsuit demands that he spend a significant amount of time away from his practice. 20 The evidence
seems to indicate that the threat of a malpractice suit is one of the
major stresses of practices today. 121 Even if the claims are eventu113. Id. at 39-40.
114. Id.
115. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14-15. See also Mechanic, supra
note 26, at 1189-92.
116. Davis, Physician'sPerspective, 10 TEx. TECH L. REV. 333, 335 (1979).
117. Id. at 334; Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1180.
118. See Davis, supra note 116, at 334; Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1180; MALPRACTicE FELn E, Apr. 30, 1979, at 2.
119. Davis, supra note 116, at 334.
120. Id. But ef. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SoCIAL
PROB. 133, 138-39 (1962) (inconclusive data indicates that sympathetic physicians may refer patients to a fellow physician who is being sued so that he
does not experience tremendous financial loss).
121. See MALPRACTICE LIFELmNE, Apr. 30, 1979, at 2. The feelings of many, if not
most, of the members of the medical profession, were summarized by the
comments made before the HEW Malpractice Commission:
Even the doctor who has never been sued is ever conscious of the
sword of Damocles hanging over his head. . . .As a physician, I live
in an aura of fear-fear of suit. Fear contributes to hostility and
rarely contributes to constructive action. ..
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ally denied or dropped, the health care provider has experienced
an anxious and desperate experience, and he is often bitter because he feels as if he has been needlessly persecuted. 122 This in
turn only further erodes the delicate balance between the health
care provider and the patient. 123 No longer is there a mutual feeling of trust and respect. Rather, the health care provider may view
each patient as a potential adversary or hesitate in developing any
channels of communication for fear of potential suit. The health
care provider's impersonal attitude bewilders and frustrates the
patient. Health care delivery must ultimately suffer under these
circumstances, for neither the health care provider nor the patient
gives maximum effort toward improving the patient's illness in the
climate of distrust.
4. Economic Effect Upon Patients
Medical malpractice has increased the cost of health care significantly. 124 This may primarily be attributed to the health care provider's exercising defensive medicine leading to unnecessary

precautionary tests and extended hospital visits. 125 And, although

126
ultihealth care providers must pay skyrocketing premiums,
mately the patient absorbs these additional insurance costs
through a direct increase in health care12 7provider's fees or increased health care insurance premiums.

C.

The Legislative Response

In an effort to address these problems and reduce the number
and size of medical malpractice liability settlements and judgments, virtually all state legislatures enacted sweeping legislation
drastically revising the medical malpractice liability system. 128 In
a two year period beginning in 1975 and ending in 1976, fifty-two

122.
123.
124.
125.

126.
127.
128.

It may be hard to believe, but we are a frightened profession.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20 (statements of George Northup).
Mechanic, supra note 26, at 1180. See also Pabst, supra note 52.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19-20.
Id. at 12-13.
See notes 111-16 & accompanying text supra. The HEW study concluded that
inflation was the primary cause of rising medical care costs, accounting for
47% of the increase; nevertheless, the report found that medical malpractice
has had a "significant" impact on the health care system. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
See text accompanying notes 102-106 supra.
See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 12-13. See also Redish, supra note
1, at 759-60.
See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 52; T. LOMBARDI, supra note 2, at 118-19;
ContinuingMedical MalpracticeInsurance Crisis: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 236-45 (1975).
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states and territories passed remedial medical practice legislation.129 This legislation significantly modified many substantive or
procedural aspects of tort law. 130 These legislative enactments va129. NAIC STuDY, supra note 65, at 3.
This legislation can be classified into three general categories. First, many
states have formed Joint Underwiting Associations (JUAs) in order to guarantee that insurance is available for health care providers. See, e.g., NEB.
REv. STAT. § 44-2837 (Reissue 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1301.801-.810
(Purdon Supp. 1979-1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 655.23 (West Supp. 1979). Second, substantive and procedural modifications have been made in tort principles. See note 130 infra. See also provisions modifying collateral source rule,
e.g., F1A. STAT. ANN. § 768.50 (West Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136

(Supp. 1979-1980); Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Page Supp. 1978); provisions limiting recoveries, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1979); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.54(2) (West Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (1977); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1979); and provisions regulating
legal fees, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.51 (West Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 147.138 (Supp. 1979-1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604 (Purdon Supp.
1979-1980). Finally, various types of medical arbitration and screening panels
were formed. For an example of legislation forming voluntary medical
screening panels, see Ai. STAT. ANN. § 34-2602 (Supp. 1979). For an example
of legislation forming mandatory screening panels, see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.44 (West Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-2 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1979); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Supp. 1979); and NEB. REv.
STAT. § 44-2840 (Reissue 1978).
130. See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 52. For instance, this legislation imposes
both direct and indirect limitations on the liability of health care providers.
The direct limits may restrict the amount which the health care provider may
be required to pay in the case of malpractice; see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 442825(2) (Reissue 1978) (health care provider who qualifies under the act is
not liable for any amount in excess of $100,000); or they may also limit the
plaintiff's total recovery; see, e.g., id. § 44-2825(1) (total amount recoverable
for any injury or death may not exceed $500,000).
Indirect limits are substantive and procedural changes in the tort system
which make it more difficult for the plaintiff to recovery without directly limiting the amount which a health care provider must pay or which a patient
may recover. These provisions include modifications in the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur;see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 4.24.290 (Supp. 1979) (plaintiff must prove by a preponderence of the evidence the negligence of a defendant in a medical malpractice action); limitations on the time period in
which an action can be brought; see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (Reissue
1978) (two year statute of limitations to commence action for negligence; but
if cause of action could not reasonably have been discovered in two years,
action can then be commenced one year from the date of discovery, but in no
event later than six years from date when the service was rendered); clarification of the doctrine of informed consent; see, e.g., id. § 44-2816 (plaintiffs
consent to treatment must be based on specific standards); limits on attorney's fees; see, e.g., id. § 44-2834 (on a motion, court shall review the moving
party's attorney's fees and allow such compensation as is reasonable); limits
on collateral source benefits; see, e.g., id. § 44-2819(1) (collateral insurance
premiums paid to the plaintiff may be credited against the judgment); written
guarantees of results; see, e.g., id. § 44-2818 (no liability will be imposed for
assurances of results unless in, writing and signed by the health care provider); elimination of the ad damnum clause; see, e.g., id. § 44-2822 (no dollar
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ried widely, depending on how seriously the malpractice crisis was
perceived in a particular state. 13 1 Many states selectively modified
132
while other states passed comprehenthe common-law system,
133
sive modifications.
Nebraska enacted the Hospital-Medical Liability Act in 1976,134
legislation patterned on the Indiana model. 135 The purpose of this
legislation was twofold: (1) to assure that adequate medical care
at a reasonable price was available in the state; and (2) to eliminate meritless malpractice claims and the needless expenditures
of time and money in handling these claims and suits. 1 36 This legislation provides the exclusive remedy for patients against a health
care provider for his negligence, unless the patient elects not to be
the act 137 or the health care provider fails to
bound by the terms of138
qualify under the act.
The following analysis discusses the two primary aspects of the

131.

132.
133.
134.

135.
136.
137.

138.

amount or figure shall be included in the demand in any malpractice petition;
reasonable damages only may be requested; and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); see, e.g., id. § 44-2840 to -2847 (establishment of medical
review panel to review all malpractice claims). See also ABA REPORT, supra
note 1, at 52-58; Comment, supra note 25, at 1417; Comment, Testing the Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Wisconsin Medical
MalpracticeAct of 1975, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 838. For an excellent analysis of
many of the constitutional challenges to medical malpractice legislation, see
id.; Redish, supra note 1, at 769-96.
See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 52. The Nebraska Act generated an enormous amount of discussion and debate both in committee and on the floor.
See L.B. 434/703, 84th Neb. Leg., 2d Sess., FloorDebate at 8580-8672, 8735-8819,
9216-28, 9441-48 (Mar. 1976); Committee on Health & Welfare: Hearingson L.B.
434, 84th Neb. Leg., 2d Sess. (Jan. 27, 1976).
See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-1 to -10-5 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1979). See
also Symposium, The 1975 IndianaMedical MalpracticeAct, 51 IND. L.J. 91168 (1975).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to -2855 (Reissue 1978). For a brief discussion of
this act and the procedural problems it may present, see D. Lathrup, Living
and Dying with the New Medical Malpractice Act in NEBRASKA ASS'N OF
TRIAL ATTORNEYS, Crvu. TRIAL PRACTICE MANuAL § 11b (1979).
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-9.5-1-1 to -10-5 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1979).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2801 (Reissue 1978).
Id. at § 44-2821(2). Electing to "opt out," however, may entail certain risks
regarding continuing treatment by the medical community. See note 157 infra. Individuals are automatically covered by this legislation unless they
choose to forego coverage by filling out certain forms which they file with the
director of insurance. The patient must also notify the health care provider of
his decision prior to treatment. Since this legislation may significantly affect
future rights, it seems imperative that a patient be properly notified of his
right to opt out. However, section 44-2821(4) requires only that the health
care provider post a sign, in a suitable location, stating he has qualified under
the Act. See also Lincoln Journal & Star, July 22, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1 (only 41
Nebraskans have elected not to be covered by the Act).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821 (1) (Reissue 1978).
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Nebraska legislation: the tort law modifications and the pretrial
screening panel. These provisions are addressed because they deprive malpractice patients of many of their common law rights,
while providing little or no commensurate benefit. They place patients who experience malpractice at a serious disadvantage and
consequently warrant evaluation in an atmosphere unlike the urgent situation in which they were developed.
III. THE NEBRASKA HOSPITAL-MEDICAL LIABILITY ACT
A.

Tort Law Modifications

The proponents of medical malpractice legislation intended to
reduce the scope of risk for health care providers by modifying numerous tort doctrines. These substantive and procedural changes
were designed to reduce the number of individuals entitled to
make a claim and limit the recovery of those parties with valid
claims. By reducing the number and size of medical liability settlements and judgments, the drafters hoped that insurance premiums would be reduced so that adequate insurance would be
available at reasonable prices.
1. Limitations on Awards
a. Ceilings on Recovery
The most direct method of controlling insurance premiums is to
limit the amount which the health care provider 39 is required to
pay and which the plaintiff is entitled to recover.1 40 As a result,
medical negligence theoretically becomes insurable at a reasonable rate. The Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act incorpo139. The term health care provider is defined in the Act:
Health care provider shall mean (a) a physician; (b) a nurse anesthetist; (c) an individual, partnership, corporation, association, facility,
institution, or other entity authorized by law to provide professional
medical services by physicians or nurse anesthetists; (d) a hospital,
or (e) a personal representative as defined in subdivision (33) of section 30-2209, who is successor or assignee of any health care provider
designated in subdivisions (a) to (d) of this subsection.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2803(1) (Reissue 1978). It is unclear why nurses, dentists and oral surgeons were excluded from this definition. This will certainly
result in difficulties when a physician and attending nurse are both charged
with malpractice, since the patient will be forced to proceed against the physician under the Act, but must resort to common law remedies when proceeding against the nurse. This is a significant oversight because nurses are
frequently implicated for having contributed to the injury. See, e.g., NAIC
STUDY, supra note 65, at 125-26 (table 18) (registered nurses contribute to the
patient injury in approximately 14% of claims made against hospitals). For a
more comprehensive definition of health care provider, see IND. CODE ANN. §
16-9.5-1-1(a) (Burns Cum. Supp. 1979).
140. See Comment, supra note 1, at 666-68; Comment, supra note 25, at 1418-20.
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rates both of these techniques, placing a $500,000 ceiling on the
amount which the plaintiff can recover 141 and limiting the liability
of a qualifying health care provider to $100,000 for all causes of action arising from any malpractice occurrence. 142 To qualify under
the Act, the health care provider must file proof of his financial responsibility with the Director of Finance in the amount of at least
$100,000 for each occurrence and pay a surcharge into the Excess
Liability Fund. 143 Any amount due from a judgment settlement
which is in excess of the total liability from all liable health care
providers is to be paid from this Excess Liability Fund.144 These
provisions are intended to ensure that most victims actually rethe costs among health care
ceive compensation, and to spread
145
providers throughout the state.
This abrogation of the common law right to full compensation
has been constitutionally challenged on numerous occasions. 146
The majority of courts have sustained provisions similar to these,
but the Supreme Courts of Illinois 147 and North Dakota 148 invali141. "The total amount recoverable under [the Act] from any and all health care
providersand the Excess Liability Fund for any occurence resulting in any
injury or death of a patient may not exceed five hundred thousand dollars."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added).
142. "A health care provider qualified under [the Act] shall not be liable to any
patient or his representative ... for an amount in excess of one hundred
thousand dollars for all claims or causes of action arising from any occurrence. . . ." Id. § 44-2825(2).
The total amount for which a health care provider may be held liable for
all occurrences or claims made in any policy year for each named insured is
$300,000, and in the case of hospitals, the aggregate liability is $1,000,000. Id.
§ 44-2824(1).
143. Id. §§ 44-2824, -2827.
144. The Director of Insurance administers this fund which is held in trust for the
purpose of satisfying judgments in excess of $100,000. Id. § 44-2829(1). The
director levies an annual surcharge on all qualified health care providers subject to two limitations: (1) the surcharge shall not exceed 50% of the annual
premium paid by the health care provider in order to maintain his current
financial responsibility, and (2) the charge will not exceed the amount necessary to maintain the fund at an approximate level of five million dollars. Id.
§§ 44-2829(2), -2830. Additional procedural requirements are found in sections 44-2829(3), (6), and 44-2831 of the Act.
145. See Comment, supra note 25, at 1418-25.
146. For cases invalidating statutory ceilings on recovery, see Wright v. Central
Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d
832 (Ohio 1976); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976). But see Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555
P.2d 399, cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97,
256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 583 (1977) (Validity and
Construction of State Statutory Provisions Relating to Limitations on
Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice Claim and Submission of Such
Claim to PretrialPanel).
147. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
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dated statutes placing a ceiling on recoverable damages.
In Wright v. CentralDu Page Hospital Association,149 the Illinois Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Illinois legislation placing a $500,000 ceiling on recoverable damages. The
court concluded the monetary limit on recovery violated the Illinois constitutional prohibition against special legislation since recovery was denied on an arbitrary basis (the restrictions applied
only to medical malpractice cases).150
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Arneson v. Olson 151 also
invalidated North Dakota's statutory ceiling of $300,000 in medical
malpractice cases, but for reasons distinct from those relied on in
Wright. The court held that the provision violated the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions, 152 and questioned whether the legislation actually achieved its intended

purpose:
Certainly the limitation of recovery does not provide adequate compensation to patients with meritorious claims; on the contrary, it does just the
opposite for the most seriously injured claimants. It does nothing toward
the elimination of nonmeritorious claims. Restrictions on recovery may
encourage physicians to enter into practice and remain in practice,
but do
153
so only at the expense of claimants with meritorious claims.

However, in Prendergastv. Nelson 5 4 the Nebraska Supreme
Court concluded that the $500,000 limit on damages under the Nebraska Medical Liability Act was valid. 155 This was a declaratory
judgment action initiated to determine the constitutionality of the
Nebraska Act after the defendant, the Director of Insurance, refused to implement the Act. The defendant argued that the
$500,000 ceiling on judgments constituted "a special privilege for
the health care provider and an undue restriction on the seriously
injured patient."'156 The court concluded, however, that the Nebraska provision withstood these challenges for several reasons.
148. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
149. 63 Ill.
2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
150. Id. at 329-30, 347 N.E.2d at 743. The court concluded that while it was not
necessary when abolishing a common law cause of action to always provide a
concomitant quid pro quo, such action will be invalid when it is done on an
arbitrary basis. Id. at 329, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
151. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
152. Id. at 136.
153. Id. at 135-36.
154. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
155. Id. at 114-15, 256 N.W.2d at 668-69.
156. Id. Essentially the defendant alleged that specific provisions of the act (medical review panel, statute of limitations, and limitations on recovery and liability) operated to single out a class of persons (health care providers) for
special treatment, action which had no rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose. However, the court looked to the legislative purpose of the act
and concluded that this classification was reasonable, citing a standard out-
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First, a patient may elect not to be bound by the terms of the Act
(1) by filing his decision not to be bound with the Director of Insurance prior to any treatment or action by the health care provider, and (2) by notifying the health care provider of this decision
as soon as is reasonable under the circumstances. 157 Second, the
plaintiff receives several additional benefits under the Act. For instance, the claimant is guaranteed an assured fund of $500,000 for
lined in an earlier medical malpractice decision, Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb.
581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976):
The Legislature may make a reasonable classification of persons, corporations, and property for purposes of legislation concerning them,
ut the classification must rest upon real differences of situations
and circumstances surrounding the members of the class relative to
the subject of the legislation which render appropriate its enactment ....
While it is competent for the Legislature to classify for
purposes of legislation, the classification, to be valid, must rest on
some reason of public policy, some substantial difference of situation
or circumstance, that would naturally suggest that justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be classified.
In holding there was some reason of public policy, some substantial
difference of situation or circumstance, that naturally suggested the
justice or expediency of the legislation with respect to malpractice
actions, we there said: There are substantial reasons for legislative
discrimation in regard to this field [malpractice]. We have seen in
recent years the growth of malpractice litigation to the point where
numerous insurance companies have withdrawn from this field. Insurance rates are practically prohibitive so that many professional
people must either remain unprotected or pass the insurance
charges along to their patients and clientele in the form of exorbitant
fees and charges. This unduly burdens the public which requires
professional services.'
199 Neb. at 112-13, 256 N.W.2d at 667-68. But see id. at 129-32, 256 N.W.2d at 67577 (White, J., dissenting) (section 44-2825 is clearly unconstitutional as special legislation).
157. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2821 (Reissue 1978). There is a question, however,
whether health care providers would be willing to accept a patient if they
suspect that he is more likely to instigate a malpractice suit, or if the patient
is seen as an unusual risk:
The majority opinion's partial reliance on the elective provisions of
the act is misplaced. The reality of the freedom to elect by a claimant
was not considered and is not easily demonstrable. Such an election
provision ignores the inequality of bargaining power. The very nature of a person's status as a patient places him in a position which
makes effective bargaining difficult. A right to elect not to be covered, from which might result a denial of service from the only hospital or physician in a geographical area, can hardly be said to be
without implicit coercion. The consideration that the election may
result in termination of services, or refusal by health care providers
to give service, because of knowledge that the patient has previously
filed a notice with the state Department of Insurance not to be covered, will cause a thoughtful person to use caution in exercising the
right,
Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. at 132,256 N.W.2d at 676-77 (White, J., dissenting).
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the payment of any malpractice claim he presents. Under the common law system of recovery, a patient had no such guarantee, and
his chances of collecting a substantial judgment against an uninsured or minimally insured health care provider were remote. In
addition, the court concluded that "the claimant is assured of a
procedure which will provide him access to an impartial medical
review panel to determine whether the health care provider met
the applicable standard of care.58In return, claimant by his election
agrees to the $500,000 ceiling."
Although this direct method of limiting recoveries contains the
"virtue of simplicity,"' 59 it raises questions of basic fairness that
are not easily answered. The initial problem is that seriously injured patients are denied full compensation for their injuries when
they exceed the $500,000 limit. Traditionally in tort, the party at
fault is responsible for his conduct. Legislation such as Nebraska's, which places a limit on the amount the injured party is
allowed to recovery and the negligent party is required to pay,
shifts this burden of paying for the wrong onto the injured party in
instances where the injury exceeds $500,000. The most seriously
injured parties-those with injuries in excess of $500,000--are denied the opportunity to be made whole. And although only a very
small percentage of the victims of medical malpractice will sustain
economic losses exceeding $500,000,160 it is these most seriously in-

jured individuals who desperately need compensation proportionate to their actual loss:
The burden cast upon patients injured by medical malpractice who suffer
damages in excess of the $500,000 limitation could be catastrophic ....
For
example, unless the patient who is a human vegetable as a result of malpractice can be compensated for the full actual damages suffered, the patient will be denied income, relationships, and quality of life to the extent
that full damages would have made this possible. Moreover, it is likely
158. 199 Neb. at 115, 256 N.W.2d at 669. It is important to note that the panel consists of one non-voting attorney and three physicians. See text accompanying
note 281 infra. This may represent a significant advantage for the plaintiff
since "either party shall have the right to call any member of the medical
review panel as a witness" in subsequent actions. NEB. REV. STAT. § 442844(2) (Reissue 1978). With medical testimony readily available, the plaintiff is no longer burdened by the "conspiracy of silence" among health care
providers. See note 345 infra.
159. Comment, supra note 1, at 667.
160. Few awards exceed $100,000. In 1970, for instance, statistics indicated that
$3,000 was the median recovery in medical malpractice actions and that 97%
of all awards are for less than $100,000. MALPRAcTMcE REPORT, supra note 1, at
10 (table 7 at 11). See also Comment, supra note 25, at 1419-20. But see NAIC
STuDY, supra note 65, at 131-34 (tables 22a-c) (summary of 16,500 claims
closed since July 1976 indicates that the average indemnity paid for each malpractice claim had risen to $7,238.00). See also id. at 148 (table 27) (only three
reported cases in Nebraska in a two year period from June 1976 to June 1978
where the amount of indemnity paid for the defendant was $50,000 or more).
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that the person whose injuries are in excess of $500,000 is the person least
able to bear the burden of those damages. In such a case the family of the
injured patient must bear the burden of the damages as well as the loss of
the patient's consortium. While it is rare that patients will suffer such catastrophic damages as a result of medical and health care malpractice,
these patients are not less important to society than other patients. The
need for compensation for actual damages suffered in a catastrophic incompelling
jury due to medical malpractice is great, and that need is more
1 61
when, the patient's family is unable to shoulder that loss.

It also seems unlikely, since malpractice awards in excess of
$500,000 are a rare occurrence, 162 that such limitation will have any
significant effect on guaranteeing that malpractice insurance is
available at reasonable rates.163 There could not be any substantial reduction in costs since the ceiling effects only a very few
cases. The most seriously injured parties, however, must bear the
burden of these limits, and these individuals are often least able to
sustain such a burden. This merely adds insult to injury, for not
proonly is the patient injured by the negligence of the health care 64
vider, he is unable to attain full compensation for his injury.1
In spite of the fact that Nebraska's limitation on recovery has
weathered constitutional challenge, it deserves further evaluation.
It is designed to reduce the cost of malpractice, but it is unlikely
that it will have any significant impact. The costs of malpractice
have merely been shifted from the health care provider and public
to the most seriously injured, an allocation which seems grossly
inequitable.
b.

Modification of CollateralSource Rule

165

Another method of limiting malpractice awards has been to
161. Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 442 n.115.1. See also W. SCHARTZ & N. KOMEsAp,
DocTORS, DAMAGES, AND DETERRANCE: AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (Rand Corp. 1978); Comment, Alternatives to the Medical Malpractice Phenomenom: Damage Limitations, Malpractice Review Panels and
Countersuits,34 WASH. & LEE L REV. 1179, 1182-86 (1977); Note, The Indiana
Medical MalpracticeAct: Legislative Surgery on Patients'Rights, 10 VAL. U.
L. REV. 303, 313-38 (1976).
162. See note 160 supra.
163. But cf. Comment, supra note 1, at 668 (direct limitations on the amount of
awards may fulfill the purpose of making health care providers more insurable). Such limitations on the amount awarded may also lead to more accurate calculations and predictions by the insurance industry. See text
accompanying notes 94-97 supra.
164. See Abraham, supra note 2, at 504.
165. For analysis of the collateral source rule in general, see Moceri & Messina,
The CollateralSource Rule in PersonalInjury Litigation,7 GONZ. L. REV. 310
(1972); Schwartz, The Collateral-SourceRule, 41 B.U. L. REV. 348 (1961); Note,
Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 H.Lv. L.
REV. 741 (1964). For analysis of the collateral source rule in the context of
medical malpractice, see Comment, Recent Developments in Medical
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modify the collateral source rule. Under the collateral source rule,
any benefits (government benefits, wage compensation, insurance
proceeds, or even payments from friends or relatives) which the
injured party receives may not be used to offset the judgment. 166
This rule, which has been accepted by most states, 16 7 "excludes
evidence of collateral source benefits and68prevents any reduction
of damages because of such payments.'
The Nebraska Act provides that the benefits of any non-refundable medical insurance reimbursement, less all premiums paid,
may be credited against the final judgment, but evidence of such
insurance is inadmissible at trial.169 The purpose of this is to prohibit the plaintiff from a double recovery, i.e., recovery from7 0both
Althe negligent health care provider and the collateral source.
though some states have gone further than Nebraska by admitting
evidence of alternative sources of compensation at trial,171 the result is essentially the same, i.e., collateral compensation is now
subtracted from the amount for which the negligent health care
provider is liable. 17 2 By thus reducing the amount for which the
negligent health care provider is held responsible, overlapping
payments are reduced, but the victim is fully compensated for his
losses if less than $500,000. Moreover, under the provision which

166.
167.
168.
169.

170.
171.

172.

Malpractice Law, 1977 Aiuz. ST. LJ. 163, 192-97; Comment, supra note 25, at
1447-50.
Comment, ARIz. ST. L.J., supra note 165, at 192-93; Comment, supra note 25, at
1447.
Moceri & Messina, supra note 165, at 315.
Comment, supra note 25, at 1447.
In any action for damages for bodily injury or wrongful death ..
evidence which tends to establish that the claimant or another person so damaged has been or shall be reimbursed or paid for any such
item of damage, cost, or expense, in whole or in part, by any
nonrefundable medical reimbursement insurance shall not be admissable in evidence or brought to be attention of the jury, but such
nonrefundable medical reimbursement insurance benefits, less all
premiums paid by or for the claimant may be taken as a credit
againstany judgment rendered.
NEB. Rav. STAT. § 44-2819(1) (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added).
The Act also defines the scope of damages: "Damages recoverable in any
action shall be those losses which have been or shall be sustained by the
claimant as a direct and proximate result of the defendant's wrongful acts as
established by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. § 44-2819(2).
See Comment, supra note 1, at 669. See also Comment, The Texas Collateral
Source Rule: A CriticalSurvey, 54 TEx. L. REV. 791 (1976).
Nebraska's provision abrogates the collateral source rule as a rule of damages but retains it as a rule of evidence. See note 169 supra. See also Comment, supra note 25, at 1447-50. Another alternative has been suggested in
which the insurer of the defendant provider is liable to the source of the collateral benefits, usually a first party medical insurer or disability insurer. Id.
at 1449.
Comment, supra note 1, at 669.
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subtracts the premium payments, the individual should be made
completely whole because he may have incurred expenses in paying for the collateral source of income such as insurance premiums. It seems only reasonable that the plaintiff should receive
legislatures have enacted
credit for these expenses, and several
173
provisions similar to Nebraska's.
It appears that modifying the traditional collateral source rule
may have a "measurable impact on premium costs" since the costs
of malpractice awards will be shifted to private and government
insurance programs. 174 As the amount which insurance companies pay is reduced, there should be a corresponding reduction in
the amount of premiums health care providers must pay. For example, one study indicated that malpractice awards would be reduced ten to twenty percent by eliminating the collateral source
rule. 75 Moreover, the injured party is not penalized for his foresight 76 since he pays for the collateral source benefits to provide
177
security for his injuries rather than to provide double recovery.
To allow additional recovery after the injured party's loss has been
fully compensated burdens society substantially since these payments result in increased malpractice premiums, costs which the
173. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-471(b) (1976); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-19-34 (Supp.
1978).
174. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 56. However, it seems reasonable to conclude
that insurers will intervene and exercise a right of subrogation, thus holding
the negligent health care provider or his insurer liable for the full recovery.
This would appear to frustrate the purpose of allowing the set off (reducing
the amount which the health care providers ultimately pay in order to minimize insurance costs). See Comment, supra note 1, at 669.
175. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 56-57. This study indicated, however, that there
are several factors which may limit the premium reductions to be gained by
eliminating the collateral source rule. The most important of these seems to
be that insurers are unlikely to reduce premiums until the statistics over several years indicate that the amounts which they must pay have been reduced
by abrogating the collateral source rule. Additionally, it may be relevant that
the language of the Nebraska provision is not mandatory ("may be taken as
credit") which indicates that the judge or jury may have some discretion in
this regard. Cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Page Supp. 1978) (specific
guidelines when collateral source payments "shall" and "shall not" be
credited against a judgment).
176. This is one of the most common explanations given for preserving the collateral source rule. Since the plaintiff has paid for the benefits, he should be the
one to profit from them. See, e.g., Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307
F.2d 525, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1962): "Collateral source funds are usually created
through the prudence and foresight of persons other than the tortfeaser, frequently including the injured person himself. They are intended for the benefit of the injured person and not for that of the person who injures him. That
intention should be effectuated." See also Moceri & Messina, supra note 165,
at 315-16.
177. See Comment, supra note 25, at 1448-49.
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health care provider passes on to patients. 7 8 It seems reasonable,
therefore, that the measure of the plaintiff's damages should be
that amount which is sufficient to compensate him for his losses
and his out-of-pocket expenses in purchasing the collateral benefits.179
In Prendergast,the defendant charged that the provision in the
Nebraska Act which gives credit for collateral sources impaired
the obligation of contract in contravention of the Nebraska Constitution. 180 The court rejected this argument, stating that a party
may elect whether or not to be covered by the Act. 181 Moreover,

the court reasoned that this provision was intended to eliminate
possible windfall profits resulting
from double recovery and serves
82
a legitimate state purpose.
c.

Eliminationof the Ad Damnum Clause

The ad damnum clause is that portion of the petition in which
the plaintiff sets forth the amount of recovery sought.183 Its primary use is to establish the court's jurisdiction, 8 4 but it also
places the defendant on notice of the amount of recovery the plaintiff is requesting 85 and limits the amount which the plaintiff may
recover in cases where the defendant defaults. 86 Where the defendant actively defends, the plaintiff is generally free to amend
the amount requested and the jury is free to award any amount in
178. Id. at 1449.
179. If the health care provider's conduct is wanton or malicious the patient may
find additional recourse by complaining to the medical qualifications committee. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2848 to -2853 (Reissue 1978). Punitive damages,
however, are not allowed in Nebraska in cases involving private parties. See,
e.g., Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 230 N.W.2d 472 (1975).
180. 199 Neb. at 115-16, 256 N.W.2d at 669. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that this
legislation violated NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 16, which provides: "No ... law impairing the obligation of contracts ... shall be passed."
181. But see note 157 supra. Compare Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d
744 (1977) (abolition of the collateral source rule as it affects medical malpractice was sustained against attacks that it was unconstitutional as special
legislation, a limitation on damages, and a denial of equal protection and due
process) with Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op, 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976)
(statute modifying the collateral source rule in malpractice actions declared
unconstitutional).
182. 199 Neb. at 116, 256 N.W.2d at 669. But see id. at 129, 256 N.W.2d at 675 (section
44-2819 is "clearly unconstitutional as special legislation ....
This is a significant deviation from the total concept of restitution in that the negligent may
escape paying for the portion of damages he causes.") (White, J., dissenting)).
183. See BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 56 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See also Comment, supra
note 25, at 1451.
184. See Comment, supra note 25, 1451-52.
185. Comment, ARiz. ST. L.J., supra note 165, at 190-91.
186. Id. at 191.
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excess of the request. 187 The statement of a dollar amount in ad
damnum clauses seems to serve no important purpose in a contested case and provides little special benefit to the plaintiff. The
ad damnum clause "is the equivalent of an asking price and frequently bears little resemblance to actual damages."'188 However,
when an injured patient demands an astronomical amount, this
generates tremendous adverse publicity for the medical profession
and the public is often deceived into thinking that such awards are
commonplace and an appropriate measure of damages: 189
[T]he astronomical amounts of damages set forth in malpractice complaints by attorneys are an unnecessary source of friction between the legal and medical professions. These large demands attract sensational
newspaper coverage, impose needless anxiety and often unfounded notoriety upon defendant physicians, create a feeling of unfair persecution1 9in0
the medical world and are of no special benefit to the plaintiff-patients.

Additionally, studies seem to indicate that a request for substantial damages often results in a higher verdict. 191 Consequently, under the Nebraska Act the plaintiff is entitled to ask only
for "reasonable" damages and not for damages in any stated
amount. 192 Similar provisions eliminating the ad damnum clause
have been enacted in other states, 193 and there have been very few
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Comment, supra note 25, at 1452.
Id. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 669-70.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38. Although the overall influence of
the media is not exactly clear, an extensive study conducfed by the HEW
Medical Malpractice Commission in 1973 made several conclusions which
would seem to indicate that the media's role is substantial. For instance, the
study indicated that the depth of coverage of a malpractice incidence was
largely dependent upon "'human interest' values, such as the involvement of
a large amount of money, the sad plight of a severely injured person, or sexual misconduct." Id. at 19. But the commission also concluded that
"[dlespite isolated instances of emotionalism, bias and inaccuracy, press, radio and television coverage of medical malpractice cases and problems is, on
the whole, straightforward, factual and balanced." Id. See also Byrnes, Media
and MedicalMalpractice,reprintedin MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at
653 (Appendix).
191. Comment, supra note 25, at 1452. See generally Broeder, The University of
Chicago Jury Project,38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 759 (1959).
192. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2822 (Reissue 1978) provides: "No dollar amount or
figure shall be included in the demand in any malpractice petition or complaint, but the petition shall ask for such damages as are reasonable in the
premises." (emphasis added).
193. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.042 (West Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.51-6 (Burns Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE: ANN. § 619.18 (West Supp. 1979-1980); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.41(E) (West 1977); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231,
§ 60C (West Supp. 1979); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.42(C) (Page Supp.
1978); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 655.009(1) (West Supp. 1979). See also NEB. REv.
STAT. § 25-804 (Reissue 1976).
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challenges to this legislation. 194 Its elimination is to be applauded
since it had long outlived any useful purpose and its adverse consequences far outweighed whatever benefit such a provision may
have served.
2. Statute of Limitations
When evidence and witnesses are no longer available defendants should be entitled to assurances that they no longer must defend claims stemming from earlier conduct. 195 Traditionally,
therefore, restrictions have been imposed upon the time during
which a potential claim could be initiated. 196 In the context of
most tort actions, this time period commences "on the date of the
the claim, regardalleged act or omission which forms the basis for
197
less of the plaintiff's knowledge of his injury."'
In the medical malpractice field, however, the courts have developed numerous exceptions to this rule in an attempt to alleviate
the harshness of the limitation in cases where the plaintiff has in
good faith failed to make a timely discovery of his claim. 98 There
are four common exceptions to the statute of limitations employed
in medical malpractice actions. First, the plaintiff may plead the
cause of action as a breach of contract and consequently take advantage of the longer statute of limitations for contract actions as
opposed to the much shorter period for tort actions.1 99 Second, the
fraudulent concealment exception may apply when the health care
provider knowingly and willfully conceals errors when treating the
patient. In this case the applicable statute of limitations does not
194. But see Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1266 (La. 1978) (proscription
against ad damnum clauses will have a beneficial effect in reducing malpractice awards and is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). Section
44-2822 was not addressed by the court in Prendergast.
195. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L, REV. 1177,

1185 (1950).
196. Comment, supra note 25, at 1429.
197. Id.
198. These exceptions may apply in only a small number of cases, since the clear
majority of all claims (79.1% according to the NAIC STUDY,supra note 65, at
15 (table la, 2a)) are reported in the first two years. This study also found
that after five years, approximately 97% of all claims have been reported. Id.
199. Comment, supra note 25, at 1430. Compare NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-205 (Reissue
1975) (action on a written contract must be brought in five years) and § 25-206
(action on an oral contract must be brought in four years) with § 25-208 (action for malpractice must be brought in two years). But see Comment, supra
note 25, at 1430 n.61, which indicates that causes of action for malpractice
which are based on a breach of contract theory are disfavored by the courts
and are used infrequently by patients. Additionally, the Nebraska Act provides that no liability will be imposed on any health care provider based on a
breach of a contract assuring results unless such contract is "expressly set
forth in writing." NEB. REv.STAT. § 44-2818 (Reissue 1978).
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begin to run until the fraud is evident. 200 Third, the termination
rule exception may apply when a health care provider continues
treating a patient after making an error, but fails to discover it.201
In this situation, the health care provider is deemed negligent initially and for the entire treatment period, so the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the patient's relationship with the
health care provider is terminated. Fourth, the discovery rule exception may apply. In this case the statute of limitations does not
commence to run until the patient actually discovers, or through
of reasonable care should have discovered the inthe exercise
02

jury.2

Health care providers argue that these exceptions expose them
200. Comment, supra note 25, at 1430-31. The reason for this exception is that
there is no longer any need to protect defendants from unreasonably long
delays in filing lawsuits, since the health care provider is responsible for the
delay. 1 LoUISELL & WHZIAMS, supra note 78, 1 13.11. Generally, affirmative
acts beyond mere silence by the health care provider are necessary, especially where the silence is due to an honest mistake. Id. For cases addressing
aspects of the affirmative burden which the plaintiff must sustain in order to
prevail on a fraudulent concealment allegation, see Nardone v. Reynolds, 333
So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1976); Millett v. Dumais, 365 A.2d 1038 (Me. 1976); Dyke v. Richard, 40 Mich. App. 115, 198 N.W.2d 797 (1972), rev'd on othergrounds, 390 Mich.
739, 213 N.W.2d 185 (1973); Monroe v. Harper, 164 Mont. 23, 518 P.2d 788 (1974);
Sanchez v. Wade, 514 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974). See also CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE
§ 340.5 (West Supp. 1979) (intentional concealment tolls the statute of limitations in a malpractice action against a health care provider); Annot., 80
A.L.R2d 368, 401 (1961); Note, Tort Law-Statute of Limitations in Medical
MalpracticeActions, 1970 WIs. L. REV. 915, 918.
201. Comment, supra note 24, at 1431. See Camire v. United States, 535 F.2d 749
(2d Cir. 1976) ("continuing treatment" theory requires treatment by same
physician, associate or hospital; it does not apply where diagnosis and treatment involved separate hospital and physicians); Davies v. Reese, 197 Neb.
320, 248 N.W.2d 344 (1977) (where physician repeatedly assures patient that
breast is not cancerous but fails to conduct the proper tests, statute of limitations begins to run as of date of final negligent diagnosis); Toman v. Creighton Memorial St. Josephs Hosp., Inc., 191 Neb. 751, 217 N.W.2d 484 (1974)
(statute tolled during postoperative period where surgeon repeatedly assures
patient that she is recovering and keeps recommending further therapy); 1
LouisELL & W=iAMs, supra note 78, 1 13.08-.09. See also Comment, supra
note 25, at 1431 n.65.
202. Comment, supra note 25, at 1431-32. See Reilly v. United States, 513 F.2d 147
(8th Cir. 1975) (statute begins to run when symptoms become so grave as to
alert a reasonable person that her treatment may have been negligent); Toman v. Creighton Memorial St. Josephs Hosp., Inc., 191 Neb. 751, 217 N.W.2d
484 (1974) (statute does not commence to run until the malpractice and resulting injury is, or by the use of reasonable diligence could be, discovered).
See also 1 LOUISELL & WnZUAIS, supra note 78, 13.07; Comment, Statute of
Limitations--Malpractice-DiscoveryRule Applied to External InjuriesFraudulent Concealment and the Treating Physician's Duty to Disclose, 25
R TGERS L REV. 711 (1971); Note, Physicians-Applyingthe Statute of Limitations in Malpractice Cases, 42 NEB. L REV. 180 (1962).
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203
to perpetual liability regardless of when the incident occurred.
Moreover, the insurance industry, which during the period preced20 4
ing the crisis sold malpractice insurance on an occurrence basis,
claimed that because of the extended statute of limitations, the potential period of risk was indeterminate. 205 Consequently, insurance.companies claimed that effective rate-making was virtually
impossible and that they were being forced to maintain huge
reserves to protect themselves from claims filed many years after
the malpractice. 206 As insuring health care providers became more
uncertain, fewer insurance companies were willing to assume the
207
risk and many began to withdraw from this area.
In response, legislatures limited the time periods in which to
file a malpractice claim in order to reduce the health care provider's potential liability. Some of these provisions were excessively harsh, penalizing the injured victims while immunizing
health care providers. 208 A few provisions, for instance, created an
absolute statutory time limit in which the plaintiff could initiate an
action, barring causes of action filed after the time had elapsed
without regard to their validity. 209 Nevertheless, these provisions
imposing restricted statutes of limitations have generally with2
stood constitutional challenge. 10

203. Comment, supra note 25, at 1429.
204. See note 89 supra.
205. See Redish, supra note 1, at 765; Comment, supra note 1, at 1429. See also
notes 88-100 & accompanying text supra.
206. See Comment, supra note 1, at 1429. See generally Roddis & Stewart, supra
note 4.
207. See notes 88-100 & accompanying text supra.
208. See, e.g., TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANx. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (absolute two year statute of limitations which cuts off the patient's right to commence a medical malpractice claim two years after the occurrence of the
malpractice). This provision apparently applies although the patient did not
know, and could not reasonably have discovered within the two year period
that he had suffered a medical injury due to malpractice. For an excellent
critical analysis of this provision, see Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 426-38. In
addition to arbitrarily barring individuals who have a legitimate claim but
have been unable, after exercising due diligence, to discover their injury, this
absolute statute of limitations may result in individuals filing suits prematurely on the contingency that a basis for a cause of action might appear at
some future time. Comment, supra note 24, at 1434 n.81. See also Note, A
Four Year Statute Of LimitationsForMedicalMalpracticeCases: Will Plaintiffs Case Be Barred?,2 PAC. IJ. 653 (1971).
209. Comment, supra note 1, at 673.
210. See, e.g., Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 546 P.2d 26, appealdismissed,
429 U.S. 806 (1976) (six year statute of limitations relating to malpractice actions against health care providers neither denies due process or equal protection nor constitutes special legislation); Foley v. Morris, 339 So. 2d 215 (Fla.
1976) (legislature has authority to adopt a statute of limitations which retroactively shortens a period of limitation, provided a reasonable time is allowed
to file the suit); Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb. 581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976) (since
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The Nebraska Act provides a short statutory period (two years)
in which all malpractice actions must be commenced unless the
injury was not discoverable within this period. If it was not discoverable, the action may be commenced within one year from the
date of discovery, but in no event may it be commenced more than
six years after the date of the incident which is the basis of the
action. 2 1' This "tripartite standard" 212 (1) requires an early filing
(two years) if the injury is evident; (2) allows a very short period
(one year) to accommodate those situations in which the injury
was not discoverable in spite of the patient's good faith conduct;
and (3) imposes an absolute maximum time limitation (six
years) .213
This provision appears at first glance to accommodate the legitimate interests not only of health care providers but also of potential claimants, and for the great majority of patients it will no doubt
prove to be reasonable and equitable. However, this provision
may work a serious injustice in some cases. One such case involves fraudulent concealment:
When a physician knowingly prevents his patients from discovering the
negligence within the prescribed period, the physician himself is responsible for the delay in bringing the claim. Thus, it seems neither fair nor
logical to allow the doctor to contend under such circumstances that the
claim is stale .... A statute of limitations should not2 be
14 structured in
such a way that it might be used to perpetrate a fraud.

It would seem appropriate, therefore, that the legislature adopt an
exception by which the statute of limitations would not begin to
run in the case of fraudulent concealment until such conduct was,
or should have been by the exercise of due diligence, discovered.2 15 The tremendous burden which the plaintiff bears in order
to demonstrate affirmative fraud should adequately limit actions of
216
this nature.

211.
212.
213.

214.
215.
216.

statute of limitations for malpractice action was based on substantial differences in circumstances for health care providers it was a reasonable classification; two year statute of limitations on actions for professional negligence
was not unconstitutional as special legislation nor void for vagueness).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2828 (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added).
Comment, supra note 25, at 1434.
This maximum limit will impose a hardship on some individuals, since it will
bar meritorious claims in spite of the plaintiffs good faith efforts to file the
claim as soon as reasonably possible. See, e.g., Lincoln Journal, July 22, 1979,
§ B, at 1, col. 1. But see Comment, supra note 25, at 1434 n.79 (the unfairness
to particular individuals who have their claims barred by absolute statutes of
limitations "is outweighed by widespread societal benefit to be obtained by
making the medical risk more easily insurable.").
Comment, supra note 25, at 1434-35. See note 200 & accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., CAL CiV. PROC. CODE, § 340.5 (West Supp. 1979).
Comment, supra note 25, at 1435 n.85. See, e.g., Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.
2d 25 (Fla. 1976); Millett v. Dumais, 365 A.2d 1038 (Me. 1976); Sanchez v. Wade,
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Another such case involves the situation in which the health
care provider has left a foreign object in the patient's body. 217 The
Nebraska statute of limitations provision may work an injustice.
Since the foreign object would constitute direct evidence of negligence, the dangers of fraud, of evidence and witnesses that are no
longer available, and of frivolous legislation are absent in this situation. A statutory exception similar to that suggested for fraudulent concealment is in order.
A reasonable statute of limitations is necessary so that the
health care provider is not exposed to liability for his conduct for
an extended period of time. However, by adding these exceptions,
the interests of both the medical profession and the malpractice
victim would be handled equitably. California, for instance, has
enacted a statute which tolls the statute of limitations upon proof
of fraud or the presence in the injured patient of a foreign object
and similar excepwhich has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose,
2 18
tions are advisable for the Nebraska Act.
3.
a.

Other Indirect Modifications
Limits on Attorney Fees

The contingent fee system employed by most plaintiffs' attorneys is a source of bitter controversy. 21 9 Several states have enacted various means of constraining the attorneys' contingency
fees. 220 Some states fix a ceiling for the percentage recoverable as
attorneys' fees in medical malpractice cases, e.g., thirty-three and
one third percent in Tennessee 221 and forty percent in Idaho.2 2 2
514 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 18, at

105-08.
217. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 39, at 227-28.
218. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE, § 340.5 (West Supp. 1979). See also AIuz. REV. STAT.
§ 12-564(B), (C) (Supp. 1957-1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 23-3415(a) (Cum. Supp.
1979).
It may also be advisable to consider an exception for cases when an infant
is injured through some type of medical negligence. If the injury is not readfly detectable, but manifests itself in later years, the six year maximum limit
could present a serious hardship. See Comment, supra note 1, at 674. Several states have enacted statutes to protect infants who are unable to detect
their own injuries. See, e.g., IND. CODE Am. § 16-9.5-3-1 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1979) (two year statute of limitations except that a minor under the age of six
has until his eighth birthday to file); Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11(B) (Page
Supp. 1978) (four year statute of limitations to file a malpractice action, however, "a minor who has not attained his tenth birthday shall have until his
fourteenth birthday in which to file an action for malpractice. .. .") See also
1 LO'isELL & WnzaAMs, supra note 78, 13.12; Redish, supra note 1, at 766.
219. See notes 23-33 & accompanying text supra.
220. See 2 LOUISELL & WujA-ms, supra note 78, 20.07 n.60 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
221. TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3419 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Under the Tennessee plan, the
court may determine what fee shall be awarded an attorney who represents a
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Other states adopt a sliding scale under which the amount of recovery determines the percentage the attorney will be paid.223 For
instance, in New Jersey an attorney may receive up to fifty percent
of the first $1,000 recovered; forty percent of the next $2,000, thirtythree and one third percent of the next $50,000; and ten percent of
any amount over $100,000.224 Still other states, such as Nebraska,
allow the court to determine whether the attorney's fees assessed
are reasonable.
Nebraska's Act provides that "upon motion of either party the
court shall review the attorney's fees incurred by that party and
allow such compensation as the court shall deem reasonable."2 2 5
This approach, while repugnant to most plaintiffs attorneys, allows the court to determine on an individual basis, after analyzing
in the case, whether the attorthe particular variables involved
226
ney's charges are reasonable.
Provisions regulating attorney's fees are subject to several criticisms. First, both plaintiff's and defendant's attorneys receive
roughly proportionate wages, so such a provision serves little purpose as a regulatory device. 227 This is because the "underlying intention in limiting contingency fees..., is to reduce the number
of claims brought against health-care providers by minimizing the
medical malpractice claimant, but limits the maximum fee to one third of the
recovery.
222. IDAHO CODE § 39-4213 (1977).

223.
224.

225.

226.
227.

These provisions have several disadvantages. First, they will virtually
eliminate valid, but small claims, since it will be economically unfeasible for
attorneys to handle such cases. Conversely, unless the attorney contracts for
less than the maximum amount, an attorney may receive an improportionate
share of the large verdicts, i.e., $100,000 on a $300,000 verdict if the state has a
thirty-three and one-third flat percentage. This is true in spite of the amount
of work involved. As one commentator note, "flat percentage ceilings are too
crude a measure: they fail to provide sufficient compensation in some cases
and fail to prevent excessive compensation in others." Comment, supra note
25, at 1445.
See Comment, supra note 25, at 1445-46.
R. GOVERNING CTS. OF NJ. 1: 21-7(C). This provision was found to be constitutional. See American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court,
126 N.J. Super. 577, 316 A.2d 19, affid, 66 N.J. 258, 330 A.2d 350 (1974). See also
Note, New Jersey'sMaximum Contingent Fee Schedule: The Validity of the
Rule 1:21-7, 5 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 534 (1974). A graduated scale of contingent fees
was recommended in the MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 34-35.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2834(1) (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added). A patient also
has the right to agree to pay his attorney for his services on a per diem basis
if such agreement is exercised at the time of employment or by written agreement. Id. § 44-2834(3). The Prendergastcourt found that this provision establishing court review of attorneys fees was valid. 199 Neb. at 116-17, 256 N.W.2d
at 669-70.
Comment, supra note 25, at 1444.
See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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margin of profit for plaintiffs' attorneys and thereby diminishing

their willingness to handle malpractice

suits.

'2 2 8

However, this

measure will not discourage attorneys from accepting plaintiffs'
cases since the defendant is unable to request the court to review a
plaintiff's attorneys fees. As long as the client is satisfied with the
fees which the attorney has charged him, the opposing party has
no recourse to the court.
Second, courts may abuse their discretion when reviewing attorney's fees when the court has no specific guidelines to follow.
Arizona's statute,229 for instance, provides that when the court determines whether an attorney's fee is reasonable, it must consider
the following specific factors:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly.
2. The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
7. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
2 30
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

Guidelines similar to these insure uniformity in the review of attorneys fees.
Finally, it must be recognized that the contingency fee system
currently eliminates small or questionable claims, since attorneys
refuse to handle these claims, even if meritorious, because they
are unprofitable. 23 1 If attorneys are unable to obtain fair compensation for their efforts due to court review of their fees, this may
discourage them from accepting even more malpractice claims.
The ultimate losers then may be the victim's of medical negligence
since they might be unable to obtain qualified counsel.
232
b. Informed Consent

A patient is entitled to know what will happen to his body and
228. Comment, supra note 1, at 671.
229. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-568(A) (Supp. 1957-1979).
230. Id. These provisions were derived from ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsinnrxy, CANONS, No. 2, DR 2-106(B) (1)-(8) (1978). See also F. MACKINRoN,
supra note 23; State ex rel.Nebraska Bar Ass'n v. Richards, 165 Neb. 80,90,84
N.W.2d 136,143 (1957) (charging a "clearly excessive" fee is a ground for discipline).
231. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33.
232. There is an abundance of material written on this topic. Several of the more
thorough analyses include 2 LouisELL & WILLiAms, supra note 78,
22.01-.09;
Marks, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice Cases in Defense Research
Institute, Defense of Medical Malpractice Cases, 57 (D. I-irsh ed. 1977);
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to participate actively in any decisions which will be made affecting it.233 He should be thoroughly informed of the anticipated beneficial results, the potential risks involved, and the consequences
of foregoing treatment.234 In sum, the patient must have all the
necessary information in order to make an intelligent and informed choice whether to proceed with treatment. 235 This doctrine
of informed consent is based on the belief that "[elvery human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what

shall be done with his own body.. .-236

A health care provider who neglects to make adequate disclosures to a patient of the risks associated with a particular treatment may be held liable to the patient for consequent harm,
regardless whether the health care provider has exercised the
highest standard of care.2 37 The difficulty with this doctrine is that
the existence or nonexistence of the informed consent has been
determined entirely on a case-by-case basis. Because all the deci2 38
sions are unique, they are uncertain guides to future conduct.
This in turn has led to additional, often unnecessary, litigation to
determine whether the patient's consent was informed. 239 Genuine misunderstandings arise because health care providers may
believe they have thoroughly explained the treatment and its possible ramifications to the patient, but the patient may not have understood much of what was said, or his expectations may have
been so high that he disregarded the health care provider's warnings. 24° Moreover, health care providers face a dilemma in many
cases since disclosing all possible risks involved might frighten the
patient, perhaps doing more harm than good, or perhaps even reeven where the potential
sulting in the patient "refusing treatment
'
benefit would far outweigh the risk. 241

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Shartsis, Informed Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REV. 527
(1972); Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
628 (1970); Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1028 (1961) (physician's duty to inform patient
of the nature and hazards of disease or treatment); Note, Restructuring
Informed Consent Legal Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79
YALE L.J. 1533 (1970). See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 74.
Id.
Id.
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914),
rev'd, Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E. 3 (1957).
Comment, supra note 25, at 1436-37.
Id. at 1437.
Id.
MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 75.
Id. The reason for this is that patients are often apprehensive about potential
treatment. In those cases where there is a genuine concern that the benefits
of informing the patient will be outweighed by the anxiety which this creates
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The Nebraska Act provides that "[ilnformed consent shall
mean consent to a procedure based on information which would
ordinarly be provided to the patient under like circumstances by
health care providers engaged in a similar practice in the locality
or in similar localities." 242 The problem with a measure such as
this is that it places the patient's right to be informed entirely
within the discretion of the medical profession, without any inquiry into the importance the undisclosed information would have
for the patient. It also requires a plaintiff to use expert testimony
to prove 243 nondisclosure of pertinent information, and such testi-

mony is often difficult to obtain.244

In order to avoid further confusion, the legislature should define more precisely what factors the health care provider must disclose to the patient in order to allow the health care provider to
rest assured that the patient's consent is truly informed. For instance, six factors have been suggested which are appropriate for
disclosure where circumstances permit: (1) the diagnosis; (2) the
general nature of the contemplated procedure; (3) the risks involved; (4) the prospects of success, (5) the prognosis if the procein the patient, a close relative or friend should be fully informed. Id. See
Comment, supra note 24, at 1439-40. See also 2 LouiSELL & WLiAms, supra
note 78,
22.02 ("The Emotionally Unstable or Unduly Apprehensive Patient").
242. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2816 (Reissue 1978). See also Canterbury v. Spence, 464
F.2d 772, 787-88 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (the relevant topics which the physician must communicate to the patient are "the inherent
and potential hazards of the proposed treatment, the alternatives to that
treatment, if any, and the results likely, if the patient remains untreated); 2
LouisELL & WiL.rams, supra note 78, 22.03 ("Community Standards as to
Disclosure").
243. Regarding the burden of proof in informed consent cases, the Nebraska Act
provides that
[b] efore the plaintiff may recover any damages in any action based
on failure to obtain informed consent, it shall be established by apreponderance of the evidence that a reasonably prudent person in the
plaintiff's position would not have undergone the treatment had he
been properly informed and that the lack of informed consent was the
proximate cause of the injury and damages claimed.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2820(2) (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added).
244. See note 345 infra. The general rule in jurisdictions using the locality test
seems to be that "the patient must prove standards of disclosure among reasonable medical practitioners in the same or similar circumstances by adducing expert testimony, as well as facts showing that defendant's disclosures
did not accord with such community standards." 2 LouisELL & Wrijis,
supra note 78, 22.03, at 594.48. Accord, Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d
958,95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971). Contra,Berkey v. Anderson, 1 Cal. App. 3d 790,82
Cal. Rptr. 67 (1969); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 260, 286 A.2d 647
(1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972). See also Note, A
New Standard of Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice Cases-The Role
of the Expert Witnesses, 18 ST. Louis U. L.J. 256 (1973).
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dure is not performed; and, (6) alternate methods of treatment, if
any.245 If this disclosure is to be meaningful, it is also essential
that it is made in terms which the patient can understand, and any
legal implications of the consent must be made known before the
patient signs.246 The statute might provide for a written consent
form incorporating these provisions. 247 When the patient signs the
form, after having had an opportunity to read it and ask questions,
a rebuttable presumption arises that the consent was based on adequate disclosure. 248 Such a provision would have the added advantage of uniformity. 24 9
Health care providers contend that such detailed disclosures
are seldom possible25 0 and certainly there are circumstances
where the health care provider should be under no duty to disclose.25 1 But a more precise scheme of disclosure balances both
the interests of health care providers and patients, and provides
245. 2 LOUISELL & W.LIAams, supra note 78, 1 22.01, at 594.43-.44. See also Note,
supra note 232, at 1561 (listing nine factors that should be disclosed to the
patient).
246. See Comment, supra note 25, at 1438.
247. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 768.46 (West Cum. Supp. 1979); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 147.137 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2317.54 (Page
Supp. 1978). See also MALPRACTCE LIFELINE, Apr. 30, 1979, at 6-7. The Texas
legislature has taken a detailed "spell-it-out" approach to informed consent.
The Texas Medical Disclosure Panel, comprised of six physicians and three
attorneys, was created to delineate long lists of medical and surgical procedures and then to outline the specific risks with each that must be disclosed
to patients. This information is given in writing to the patient and signed in
the presence of a witness. This creates a rebuttable presumption that the
physician has given sufficient information to the patient of potential risks. It
is hoped that such an approach will eliminate the physicians' uncertainty
about what they must and must not reveal to the patients. TEX. REV. Crv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 6.01-.07 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1980); Comment, Medical
Liability and InsuranceImprovement Act of Texas: The New Legislative Procedure for Amputation of Patient's Rights, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 481, 494-501
(1978).
248. Comment, supra note 1, at 676. The communication between the health care
provider and patient which is necessary to satisfy these written consent
forms may also improve the physician-patient relationship in general. See id.
See also notes 77-87 & accompanying text supra.
249. See MALPRATICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 74-75. But cf.MALPRACTICE DIG.
Jan./Feb. 1979, at 2 ("Many of the written consent forms currently utilized
will not stand up to judicial scrutiny. No form will eliminate all possibility of
an action or guarantee a favorable outcome if suit is instituted.").
250. 2 LOUisELL & WILLAmS, supra note 78, 22.01, at 594.44. Health care providers
argue that most procedures are exceptionally complex and virtually impossible to explain to lay persons. They also claim that disclosing all the details
creates unnecessary anxiety, and that there are an infinite number of possible adverse results, none of which are necessarily probable, so health care
providers are unable to determine precisely when to stop disclosing. Id.
251. There are a number of current exceptions in which the health care provider is
under no duty to disclose, including certain emergency treatments, common
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clearer guidance for future conduct. Regardless which approach
the legislature takes, more thoughtful drafting is needed in this
area to eliminate the present uncertainty both health care providers and patients experience.
c.

Written Guarantees

Although oral warranties are only infrequently relied on as the
basis of a malpractice suit, 2 5 2 the Nebraska Act provides that "[n] o
liability shall be imposed upon any health care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of an express or implied contract assuring
results... , unless such contract is expressly set forth in writing
.... "253 Consequently, any guarantees or assurances of successful treatment are unenforceable unless they are committed to writing. This provision is intended to allow health care providers to be
reasonably optimistic without incurring potential liability for
breaching an implied warranty contract.2 5 4 It also prohibits the
court from implying a contractual warranty without concrete evidence. 255 Requiring assurances of results to be in writing may
eliminate much of the uncertainty caused by alleged oral guarantees, and may encourage health care providers to make reasonable
therapeutic assurances to the patient. This would facilitate better
communications, and consequently better relations between the
health care provider and the patient. In addition, since poor communications
is a significant contributing factor in the malpractice
CriSiS, 2 5 6 this psychological support may play an important role in
reducing malpractice suits. 257 The contrary may also be true, however, i.e., health care providers may be less cautious in making oral
guarantees, realizing that their liability is limited to whatever asknowledge, unknown risk, waiver and "therapeutic exceptions." See Comment, supra note 24, at 1439.40. See generallyW. PROSSER, supranote 12, § 18.
252. Comment, supra note 1, at 676. From the plaintif's standpoint there are two
distinct advantages of pleading the malpractice case as one of breach of contract: "[BIreach of contract is generally easier to prove than negligence and
contract actions are subject to longer statutes of limitations." Comment,
supra note 24, at 1450. See MALLPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30; But see
note 199 & accompanying text supra. See generally Note, Express Contracts
to Cure: The Nature of ContractualMalpractice, 50 IND. L.J. 361 (1975); 41
TENN. L. REV. 964, 966 (1974).
253. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2818 (Reissue 1978). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.01

(West Cum. Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-4 (Burns Cum. Supp.
254.
255.
256.
257.

1979); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1335.05 (Page 1979); UTAH CODE A3NN. § 78-14-6
(1953).
Comment, supra note 1, at 676.
Id.
See notes 77-87 & accompanying text supra.
However, allowing only written contracts of assurance may also eliminate a
meritorious claim based on a legitimate assurance by the health care provider which is not in writing. Comment, supra note 25, at 1451.
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surances are expressly set forth in writing. The ultimate success
of this provision may be based on two tenuous premises: (1) that
patients are aware that any assurances or guarantees from the
health care provider must be in writing, and (2) that the patient
will insist that these assurances are included in a written guarantee. It seems unlikely that most patients would be aware of either
of these elements. Consequently, patients who reasonably rely on
health care providers' oral assurances may be deprived of a remedy simply because they were unaware that such promises must
be in writing or were unwilling to demand a written guarantee.
d.

Standard of Care

Traditionally, a health care provider was required to meet the
standard of performance generally adhered to in the community or
locality where he practiced, i.e., the health care provider was required to exercise the reasonable care and skill expected of a
health care provider living in that geographic area.258 There was a
tendency by the judicial branch, however, to expand the standard
of care in order to hold health care providers to a higher standard,
the standard of care in similar communities. 2 9 Proponents argued
that what was necessary was a uniform nationwide standard of
care 260 based on the most progressive medical techniques available, and this is precisely the direction in which many courts were
headed. 2 61 The injured party could more readily establish negligent conduct since the alleged conspiracy of silence no longer
258. Comment, supra note 1, at 674. See A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
43-53 (2d ed. 1978); 1 LOuISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 78, 8.06; Waltz, The
Rise and GradualFall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAuL L REV. 408 (1969); Comment, MedicalMalpractice-The "Locality Rule" and the "Conspiracyof Silence", 22 S.C. L. REv. 810 (1970). See
generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 30; Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 420 (1971);
Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 440 (1971).
259. Comment, Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 39 OIO
ST. L.J. 855, 866 (1978).
260. 1 LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 78, T 8.06, at 211.
261. See, e.g., Murphy v. Little, 112 Ga. App. 517, 145 S.E.2d 760 (1965); Griego v.
Grieco, 90 N.M. 174, 561 P.2d 36 (1977); Hirschberg v. State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 398
N.Y.S.2d 470 (1977); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 84 R.L 67, 121 A.2d 669 (1956); Hundley
v. Martinez, 151 W. Va. 1013, 158 S.E.2d 159 (1967). But see Correia v. United
States, 339 F.2d 596 (1st Cir. 1964); Bullard v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 31
N.C. App. 312, 229 S.E.2d 245 (1976); Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 550
P.2d 1158 (1976). The Nebraska courts, however, have generally adhered to
the locality standard of care. See, e.g., Anderson v. Moore, 202 Neb. 452, 275
N.W.2d 842 (1979); Kortus v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261, 237 N.W.2d 845 (1976);
Mecham v. McLeay, 193 Neb. 457, 227 N.W.2d 829 (1975); Halligan v. Cotton,
193 Neb. 331, 227 N.W.2d 10 (1975); Bailey v. Williams, 189 Neb. 484,203 N.W.2d
454 (1973); Meyer v. Moell, 186 Neb. 397, 183 N.W.2d 480 (1971).
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presented a significant obstacle, 262 and the patient was not limited
to a specific geographic area in selecting his expert witness.
In an effort to shield health care providers from the increased
liability which resulted from this broad standard, the Nebraska Act
adopted the locality rule for medical malpractice cases:
Malpractice or professional negligence shall mean that, in rendering professional services, a health care provider hasfailed to use the ordinaryand
reasonablecare, skill and knowledge ordinarilypossessed and used under
like circumstancesby members of his professionengaged in a similarpractice in his or in similarlocalities. In determining what constitutes reasonable and ordinary care, skill, and diligence on the part of a health care
provider in a particular community, the test shall be that which health
care providers, in the same community or in similarcommunities and engaged in the same or similarlines of work, would ordinarily exercise
and
263
devote to the benefit of their patients under like circumstances.

Although this locality rule may reduce the number of successful malpractice suits and create a favorable environment for the
insurance industry, it may also permit the standard of care in a
particular community (especially a rural community) to lag substantially behind modern medical advancements. 264 In light of the
"improved educational opportunities and communication there is
little justification for a small town doctor to be less expert than a
metropolitan area doctor claiming the same degree of specialization. ' 265 At the very least, if the health care provider practices in
an area which lacks the best facilities or latest techniques, he
should be required to advise his patients and allow them to decide
whether to pursue treatment elsewhere. 266 In sum, holding health
care providers to the standard of care in the community may reduce the number of instances where the plaintiff can establish that
the health care provider was negligent if the community has a
lower standard, but it may do so at the expense of medical proficiency and fundamental fairness to the patient.
B.

Pre-Trial Review PaneI267
A pre-trial review panel is an alternative adjudicatory device

262. Comment, supra note 1, at 675. It may, however, present an even greater
financial burden to the patient who is required to pay travel expenses for
experts traveling long distances.
263. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2810 (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added).
264. Comment, supra note 1, at 678.
265. Comment, supra note 259, at 867 (footnote omitted).
266. 1 LOuiSELL & WILLIAMs, supra note 78, 8.06, at 212.
267. There are three primary differences in these panels: 1) Mandatory v.
Voluntary: whether the malpractice claim must go to the pretrial panel stage
before being litigated or whether it proceeds directly to trial unless a party
requests a panel hearing, 2) Pre-Complaint v. Post-Complaint Review:
whether the panel hears the complaint prior to formal initiation of litigation
(the majority of panels are pre-complaint), and, 3) Influence of the Panel: the
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which facilitates the resolution of malpractice disputes. 268 While
damage limits are a legislative effort to confront the problems after
the malpractice is established, review panels attempt to confront
the problem at the outset of the claim. Unlike an arbitrator's decision, the conclusions of these panels are typically not binding on
the parties, so a party who is dissatisfied with the panel's determination may proceed to trial.26 9 These panels evolved from a general dissatisfaction with traditional trial procedures. Proponents
of pre-trial review panels argued that traditional litigation procedures were lengthy, time consuming and expensive. 27 0 Moreover,
they felt that inexpert decision makers (jurors, attorneys and
claims administrators) were making erroneous decisions and
271
granting excessive awards.
Pre-trial review panels were seen as a viable alternative to the
traditional trial which could quickly and inexpensively screen out
272
meritless claims while settling disputes in an equitable fashion.
Moreover, it was believed that since this procedure was informal
and private, with objective, qualified individuals making the deter27 3
mination, many claims would be resolved at this initial stage.
Parties would be better equipped and under greater pressure to
negotiate settlements since the merits of their cases would become
apparent during the panel hearings. The alternative advantage to
plaintiffs was that these panels would operate as discovery devices, 274 and plaintiffs would be entitled to subpoena the panel

268.
269.

270.

271.
272.
273.
274.

degree of influence which the panel's decision will have on the final outcome.
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 43. For an excellent analysis of medical-legal
screening panels, see Documentary Supplement, supra note 57. For an
extensive comparative analysis of the various alternative means of dispute
resolution in malpractice cases, see Baird, Munsterman & Stevens,
Alternatives to Litigation, I" Technical Analysis, reprinted in MALPRACTICE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 214 (Appendix).
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
See Comment, supra note 1, at 682. See generally Comment, supra note 24, at
1463-67; Virginia Legal Research Group, Alternatives to Litigation,IV- The
Law ofArbitrationin the U.S., reprintedin MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note
1, at 346 (Appendix).
See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. See also notes 57-60 & accompanying
text supra. Additional problems with a traditional trial in the malpractice
context are long delays between filing and disposition, which increases costs;
difficulties in obtaining qualified expert witnesses to testify; increased costs
in preparing the case, nuisance suits; and complexity of subject matter. Comment, supra note 161, at 1186-87. The majority of problems typically attributed to the present fault-liability approach to resolving medical malpractice
claims are outlined in Note, supra note 90, at 96-97.
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id. However, some individuals objected to these panels for precisely this reason, fearing that the opposing counsel would abuse these discovery devices
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members to appear at' 27
the subsequent trial,275 thus avoiding the
"conspiracy of silence. 6 Finally, it was

believed that such proce277

dures would significantly reduce the burden on the courts.

Prior to 1975, only New Hampshire had provided for pre-trial
review by statute, although New Jersey had a similar procedure by
court rule. Since 1975, twenty-seven states, including Nebraska,
have adopted some form of statutory pre-trial review panel, while
eleven other states
had some form of binding or non-binding arbi278
tration panel.
Although Nebraska's pre-trial review panel bears similarities to
many of these panels, it is more comprehensive than most. Under
the Nebraska Act,279 before an individual may commence a malpractice claim against a health care provider in any court in the
280
state, the claim must be presented to a medical review panel.
This panel is composed of three licensed physicians and one attorney, who has no vote, but who acts in an advisory capacity as chairman of the panel. 281 In addition, the Director of Insurance
appoints a physician from the members of the Board of Examiners
of Medicine and Surgery to observe and advise the panel.282 The

panel is selected from a pool of all the licensed physicians actively
practicing in the state.283 Each party to the action selects one physician, and these two physicians select a third physician to serve
on the panel. 28 4 Once these panelists are selected, they are re-

quired to serve unless they are excused by the court for good

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

281.
282.
283.
284.

to build a much stronger case on his opponents efforts. See Comment, ARiz.
ST. L.J., supra note 165, at 179; Note, Ohio's Rxfor the Medical Malpractice
Crisis: The PatientPays, 45 U. Cmn. L. REV.90, 101-02 (1976).
See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2844(2) (Reissue 1978).
See note 345 infra.
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
Id. at 41-42.
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-2840 to -2847 (Reissue 1978).
Id. § 44-2840(2). These provisions apply to all malpractice claims, id.
§ 2840(1), unless the health care provider does not qualify under the act or
the patient elects not to be covered. Id. § 44-2821(1), (2). The proceedings
before the panel are initiated when the patient or his representative delivers
(or mails by certified or registered letter) a copy of the complaint upon the
Director of Insurance personally. Id. § 44-2840(3). This notice must indicate
the plaintiffs choice of physician and attorney and the court where any necessary action will be filed. Id.
Id. § 44-2841(1).
Id. § 44-2847(2). The purpose of this observer is to insure uniformity in these
procedures, but alternative means of insuring uniformity are also advisable.
See, e.g., note 300 infra.
Id. § 44-2841(2) (a).
Id. § 44-2841(2) (b). If one of the health care providers involved is a hospital,
the hospital must select a fourth panelist who is a hospital administrator. Id.
If multiple parties are involved, the plaintiffs and defendants select only one
physician each. Id. § 44-2841(2) (c).
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cause, i.e., facts demonstrating that service on the panel would
constitute an "unreasonable burden or undue hardship. '285 Each
party may twice challenge without cause a selection by the opposing party.286 If both challenges are exercised, the judge then submits a list comprised of three qualified panelists, each party is
allowed to strike one name from this list, leaving the finalist to
"serve in place of the challenged panelist designated by the party
parties are unable to
....
,,287 A similar procedure is used if the288
agree on an attorney to serve on the board.
Several initial problems are presented by this provision. Although the selection process may be objective, it could result in an
attorney with no expertise in malpractice litigation advising the
physicians on the panel. Different legal standards may consequently be applied in determining whether there is a material issue of fact, and whether there is a sufficient case for submission to
the court or jury.28 9 The absence of attorneys who are qualified to
handle malpractice cases reduces the potential effectiveness of the
panel. 290 Moreover, in cases involving multiple parties, it seems
inevitable that disagreements among the parties will arise over
which physician should serve on the panel. 291 This will be particularly true when several specialists are defendants, and such disagreements may result in additional delays and expenses.
After the panel is selected, the parties submit their evidence in
written form only.2 92 If a party fails to submit his evidence in a
reasonable time, the panel may make a determination based on
whatever evidence has been submitted. 293 The parties may submit
medical charts, x-rays, laboratory test results, excerpts of treatises,
depositions of witnesses and parties, or any other written form
285. Id. § 44-2841(2) (d). The panelists are compensated only $30 a day for all work
performed as a member of the panel. Id. § 44-2845. At first glance this would
not appear to encourage participation, but it may represent a small sacrifice
to pay for reduced premiums. See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.44(i) (West
Cum. Supp. 1979) (each non-judical panelist is paid $100 per day for expenses).
286. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2841(2) (f) (Reissue 1978).
287. Id.
288. Id. § 44-2841(2) (g).
289. Mallor, supra note 32, at 113.
290. Id. Alternatively, since the court supplies the list of qualified attorneys this
may result in a small group of attorneys being required to serve numerous
times.
291. One study indicated that 44% of the claims presented involved multiple defendants. See NAIC STU=Y, supra note 65, at 53 (table 11).
292. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2842(1). This is consistent with the purpose of maintaining an informal proceeding without cross examinations and lengthy oral
presentations. See notes 334-37 & accompanying text infra.
293. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2842(1) (Reissue 1978). The panel determines what a
reasonable time is. Id.
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which the panel allows. 294 Moreover, the panel has the duty to request all the necessary information, consult with medical authorities and examine all the necessary reports in order to inform fully
itself regarding the issue to be decided. 295 Both parties have full
296
access to any material submitted to the panel.
When all the evidence has been submitted, either party, after
giving ten days notice to the other party, may convene the panel at
a time and place agreeable to the panel members. 297 Either party
may present "argument concerning any matters relevant to issues
to be decided by the panel before the issuance of its report."298 All
proceedings before the panel, all actions taken by the parties in
preparing for the proceedings and all matters submitted to the
are conducted in private
panel are confidential. 2 99 The hearings
300
and are not matters of public record.
After reviewing all the evidence the panel must, within thirty
days, express its opinion in writing as to whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant neglected to act within the
applicable standard of care. 30 1 The panel is free to return one of
three decisions:
(a) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant failed to
comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the complaint
in specified particulars;

(b) The evidence supports the conclusion that the defendant involved
met the applicable standard of care required under the circumstances; or
(c) There is a material issue of fact, not requiring expert opinion, bearing on liability for consideration by the court or jury in specified particu294. Id. The depositions of parties and witnesses may be taken prior to convening
of the panel if the attorney of the health care provider is furnished a copy of
the petition which the claimant intends to fie 10 days before the deposition is
taken. Id. § 44-2842(2). Moreover, the patient is entitled to receive all the
medical and hospital records relating to the case which are admissable in
evidence in a court of law. Id.
295. Id. § 44-2843(1).
296. Id.
297. Id. § 44-2842(3).
298. Id. This provision is unclear in that the parties may elect to present extensive
argument. This may present a problem of expediency. A possible suggestion
would be to limit the argument to what the panel deems reasonable.
299. Id. § 44-2846(1).
300. Id. Although these privacy provisions are worthwhile from the patient's
point of view, they also "operate to impede predictability and uniformity of
decision." Comment, supra note 25, at 1463. If the panel decisions and reasoning were made public, this would encourage settlements by forecasting
how particular cases have been addressed in the past. Id. In order to protect
the party's identity, the panels decision could be published without the
party's name. Id. This type of data collection would be extremely beneficial
in reducing nonmeritorious claims, since it would indicate how similar claims
had been resolved in the past.
301. Id. § 44-2843(2).
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302

lars.

The panel is to concern itself only with these issues, and they are
not to consider or report on disputed questions of law. 30 3 Nor does
the panel estimate the dollar amount of damages or the percentage
of disability. 304 A majority vote of the panel members controls. 305
The claimant may subsequently request a review by filing his
request and a copy of the alleged complaint with the Director of
Insurance. 306 The report of the panel is admissible in evidence at
trial, but the report is not conclusive and either party may call any
302. Id. § 44-2843(3) (a)-(c).
303. Id. § 44-2847(1).
304. Id. § 44-2843(4). There appear to be several reasons for excluding damage
provisions, one of which is based on the same objection which applies to ad
damnun clauses, ie., they are not a true approximation of what a plaintiff
actually expects to recovery. See notes 183-94 & accompanying text supra.
Additionally, estimating damages can involve tedious and difficult issues
which would proportionately reduce the panel's efficiency. Even if the panel
were to assume such a function, it is questionable whether the voting members (physicians) would be adequately trained in this field.
Some states, while prohibiting their panels from determining damages, allow the panels to draw limited findings as to liability. For instance, in Indiana
the panel may also decide that "It] he conduct complained of was or was not a
factor of the resultant damages. If so, whether the plaintiff suffered: (1) any
disability and the extent and duration of the disability, and, (2) any permanent impairment and the percentage of the impairment." IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-9.5-9-7 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1979). A detailed finding of liability would be
within the scope of the panel's actions and would not seem to unnecessarily
delay the process. Furthermore, this additional determination would assist
the counsel in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of their cases, thus
enhancing the possibility for settlement. See Comment, supra note 25, at
1460. Other statutes provide that the panel shall determine the amount of
damages. See, e.g., ARm. STAT. ANN. § 34-2605 (Cum. Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 58.7(1) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1979).
305. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2843(4) (Reissue 1978).
306. Id. § 44-2844(1). Arizona enacted legislation which required that if the review
panel's finding was favorable to the defendant, the plaintiff had to post a
$2,000 bond payable to the defendants for the assessed costs and fees in the
event he did not prevail at trial, and the action was dismissed if the bond was
not posted. Similarly, if the panel found for the plaintiff, the defendant had to
post a $2,000 bond or suffer a default judgment. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12567(I), (J) (Supp. 1957-1979). These provisions were declared unconstitutional, however, in Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977) (violations of privilege and immunities clause of the state constitution). See
Comment, ARiz. ST. L.J., supra note 165, at 188-90. But see MASs. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 231, § 60B (West Cum. Supp. 1979) (only plaintiff is required to file a
$2,000 cost bond if the review panel finds for the defendant and the court may
increase this amount at its discretion; the action is dismissed if the bond is
not posted within 30 days; if the plaintiff is indigent, the court may reduce,
but not eliminate the amount of the bond). This provision was held to be
constitutional in Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1977).
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member of the review panel as a witness. 30 7 If called, the panel
members are required to appear and testify, but they are absolutely immune from civil liability "for all communications, findings, opinions and conclusions made in the course and scope of
[their] duties .... ",308
In Prendergastv. Nelson,30 9 the Nebraska Supreme Court rejected all of the plaintiff's constitutional challenges to the medical
review panel provisions of the Nebraska Act, though some of these
objections had been 3accepted
by courts in other jurisdictions hear10
ing analogous cases.
The defendant argued first, that requiring individuals to submit
their claims to a panel prior to initiating an action in court violated
a provision of the Nebraska Constitution which provides: "All
courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due
31
course of law, and justice administered without denial or delay." '
The court concluded that this constitutional provision was merely
a general declaration of rights and remedies, and that the legislature was vested with the power to impose a special procedure
before resorting to the courts. 312 The defendant was not denied
access to the courts since the panel's limited finding was not binding and he was free to proceed to the courts for a final determination.313
Second, the defendant argued that this procedure deprived him
of his right to jury trial in violation of the state3 14 and federal con307. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2844(2) (Reissue 1978). Any minority reports of the
panel are also admissable. Id.
308. Id. § 44-2844(3).
309. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
310. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 11l. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth
Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976). But see Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Carter v. Sparkman, 355 So. 2d
802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied,429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 97
Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Everett v.
Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985
(Mass. 1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 App. Div. 2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1976),
aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977); Halpern v. Gozan,
85 Misc. 2d 753, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1976); State ex rel. Strykowski v.
Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
311. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.

312. 199 Neb. at 103, 256 N.W.2d at 663.
313. Id. at 105, 256 N.W.2d at 664. It is important to note that when a party requests a review, the statute of limitations is tolled for 90 days after the opinion of the panel is rendered. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2844(1) (Reissue 1978).
314. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate
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stitutions. 31s But the court again rejected the defendant's contentions because the jury, not the panel, is the ultimate arbitrator of
all factual issues presented. 316 This procedure merely furnishes
expert testimony for consideration in subsequent court actions.
Even if an adverse panel finding might unduly influence the jury at
the trial, the court felt that this would be a "two-way street which
equally affects the parties on both sides. ' 317 In fact, the court bewould be able to evaluate the panel's
lieved that juries generally
3 18
finding objectively.
Third, the defendant argued that the review panel restricted the
court's jurisdiction in violation of the state constitution. 3 19 The
court rejected this theory, however, because the Nebraska Act is
elective; the panel provides no more than an expert opinion and
has no authority to resolve finally the action; this procedure consti"no
tutes no more than a pretrial settlement conference which in
'320
way encroaches on the powers or prerogatives of the court.
Finally, the defendant contended that the review panel provision denied citizens equal protection and due process of law since
the Nebraska Act singles out a class of people (health care providers) for special treatment, but bears no rational relationship to the
legitimate purposes of the legislation. 32 1 After analyzing the complex issues in the medical field which the Act was intended to remedy, the court concluded that the classification was rational,
constitutional, and free from invidious discrimination.322 The legislature had the right to exercise its police power to implement the
Act in order to promote the general health and welfare of the citizens of the state.
Several significant features of the Nebraska Act indicate that it
may be effective. Most significant is the fact that appearance
before the panel is mandatory. 323 Any malpractice action which is
315. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved....").
316. 199 Neb. at 106-09, 256 N.W.2d at 665-66.
317. Id. at 109, 256 N.W.2d at 666.
318. Quoting Halpern v. Gozan, 85 Misc. 2d 753, 759, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748 (Sup. Ct.
1976), the court concluded: "'Historically, jurors for the most part have
proven their independence. They guard their roles with a unique jealousy."'
199 Neb. at 109-10, 256 N.W.2d at 666.
319. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 9.

320.
321.
322.
323.

199 Neb. at 110, 256 N.W.2d at 667.
Id. at 110-12, 256 N.W.2d at 667. See note 156 supra.
199 Neb. at 113, 256 N.W.2d at 668.
"No action against a health care provider may be commenced... before the
claimant's proposed petition has been presented to a medical review panel
.... " NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840(2) (Reissue 1978) (emphasis added). However, the patient can elect not to be covered by the Act, in which case the
rules of common law would seem to apply, although this is not clear from the
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not initially submitted to the review panel should be dismissed
since this step is a mandatory condition precedent. 324 Several legislatures have implemented screening panels but have made their
use optional or voluntary, 325 which diminishes much of their effectiveness. 326 This is because parties often elect to forego utilizing
the panel, for one of a number of reasons: the plaintiffs may question the objectivity of a panel composed primarily of physicians;3 27
defense attorneys may perceive these panels as no more than extensive discovery devices, and they are reluctant to provide the patients with any additional information;328 or the parties may
simply distrust the panels generally, preferring to have their case
heard by a jury comprising a cross section of the community.329 In
light of these objections, it does not appear that voluntary review
330
panels are frequently used by the parties nor are they effective.
This conclusion was supported by a study comparing the screening
331
panels in New Mexico, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
which found that appearances before these review panels must be

324.

325.

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Act. Id. § 44-2821(2). This common law application appears to be probable,
since a health care provider who fails to qualify under the Act is subject to
common law doctrines. Id. § 44-2821(1). However, the decision not to be
bound by the Act may jeopardize one's ability to receive health care. See
note 157 supra.
See, e.g., Walt Disney World Co. v. Memorial Hosp., 363 So. 2d 598 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) (plaintiffs malpractice claim dismissed because there was no
evidence it had been first submitted to medical mediation panel); Riccobono
v. Cordis Corp., 341 So. 2d 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (same); Mount Sinai
Hosp., Inc. v. Wolfson, 327 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (same); Knepper v. State, 359 So. 2d 1127 (La. App. 1978) (same); Vincent v. Voorhies, 359
So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 1978) (same; dismissed without prejudice).
Comment, supra note 25, at 1458. The majority of the statutes require all
medical malpractice claims to be presented to the panel prior to initiating any
court action. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
There are several general types of voluntary procedures: (1) those which
are voluntarily invoked by the patient, which the health care provider must
participate in, see, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2603 (Cum. Supp. 1979); (2) those
which are voluntarily invoked by either party with the non-invoking party
being forced to go through the procedure, see, e.g., VA. CODE ANN., Med. Malp.
Rules of Practice,Rule 2(C) (Cum. Supp. 1979); and (3) those which are voluntary on the part of the court, in which the court decides whether an expert
advisory opinion is needed, and both parties are required to go through the
procedure, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4901 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Documentary Supplement, supra note 57, at 715-17; Comment, supra note 25,
at 1458.
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
Id.
Id. Plaintiffs' preferences for jury trials may be legitimate, as evidenced by
one state study which found that health care providers have won 92% of all
panel decisions. See NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1980, at 1, coL 4.
ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
INsTrrUTE OF JUDIcIAL ADMInSTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS INFouR STATES (1977).
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332
mandatory because voluntary panels are largely ignored.
It is also significant that only the physicians on the panel may
vote under the Nebraska plan. Although it has been argued that
the "natural tendency of physicians will be to empathize with the
defense," 333 this may be justified in light of the exceptionally complex issues involved in the typical malpractice case and the fact
that these decisions are not binding. Moreover, the panel selection
process is impartial, giving both parties a degree of input in selecting the panel members.
Another aspect of the Nebraska review panel which indicates
that it will be successful is that the panel utilizes informal procedures throughout its proceedings. 33 Theoretically this minimizes
the expense and time necessary to appear before the panel. Many
of the plans provide most of the procedural safeguards of a court335
room trial by allowing oral testimony and cross examination.
Such full hearings may lead to more equitable findings and consequently encourage more settlements, 336 but they are also more expensive 337 and more time-consuming. Affording complete hearings

332. Id. at 42. Although the results were not conclusive, the study outlined the
characteristics of those panels which disposed of the greatest number of
cases. The study proposed.
1. The panel should determine both the extent of liability and damages.
2. The legislation must give teeth to the panel findings.
3. The chairperson of the panel must take an active role in disposing of these claims, and he must be able to control the panel
hearings.
4. The panel members must be qualified in their respective fields.
5. The panels' performance must be evaluated.
6. The parties must be able to object to the panelists.
7. The evidence must be complete.
8. Procedures must be informal and open for discussion.
9. Panels must discuss their findings with the parties.
10. Panel hearings and findings should be confidential.
11. Complete data must be kept on the panel findings.
12. Panelists should be given immunity from civil suit for actions
performed in connection with the panel.
Id. at 39-42.
333. Comment, supra note 25, at 1459.
334. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2842(3) (Reissue 1978).
335. See, e.g., Auc. STAT. ANN. § 34-2604 (Cum. Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.44(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
336. Comment, supra note 25, at 1460.
337. At this stage however it may be to early too conclude that the review panel
will significantly reduce costs. See Comment, Aiuz. ST. L.J., supra note 165, at
178-79; Comment, supra note 259, at 868-69. The panel may reduce costs only
if the parties elect to settle at this stage. Id If the parties are determined to
have their day in court, this additional step of appearing before the panel
would only increase the costs. This may present a serious impediment to the
party with limited finances, see Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 807-08
(Fla. 1976) (concurring opinion), or a small claim. Plaintiffs with small claims
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with all the procedural safeguards of a traditional trial would serve
little purpose at this stage, particularly since the conclusions of the
panel are not binding.
Although it may be too early to obtain any significant statistics
concerning the effectiveness of these panels, comparison with
other statutorily authorized systems is encouraging, 33 8 because
the Nebraska review panel incorporates many of the characteristics of the more successful panels from other states. Perhaps the
most crucial element of the Nebraska Act is that panel findings are
admissible in a subsequent trial. Allowing these findings to be admitted may dissuade the losing party from appealing. 39 This is
essential if the panel is to be effective since parties may simply go
through the motions at this stage, in anticipation of presenting the
full case to the jury at the trial stage. This practice would defeat
the panels purpose, since very few cases would be settled at this
preliminary stage. Nevertheless, many parties have attempted to
frustrate the effectiveness of these medical review panels by
merely presenting their claim to the panel without presenting any
evidence, and the courts are split on how this action should be
band'ed. For instance, in Herrerav. Doctor'sHospital,340 the plaintiffs filed their statutorily mandated request for medical mediation,
often do not pursue their cause of action because such claims are not economically appealing to attorneys and the malpractice procedures are confusing, time-consuming and expensive. See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 48-49.
Furthermore, any additional delays at this stage will only increase the costs.
However, these delays may be inevitable, particularly in cases involving multiple defendants. See MALPAcTIcE REPORT, srupranote 1, at 91; ABA REPORT,
supra note 1, at 53-55 (40% of medical malpractice claims involve more than
one defendant and it is not uncommon for a patient to sue three or more
health care providers at one time).
It seems quite likely, then, that unless the review panels are capable of
effectively encouraging settlement and screening malpractice claims from the
courts, they very will may increase, rather than decrease, the cost of handling
malpractice claims. But see MALPRACTICE DIG., Mar./Apr. 1978, at 3. A study
of screening panels in Massachusetts indicates that they are screening out an
extensive number of claims that should never have been initiated. Of 140
cases found to be insufficient to raise a question of liability, only 29 proceeded
to lawsuit. This may be misleading, however, in that a party against who the
panel renders an adverse finding must post a $2,000 bond to proceed to trial.
See note 306 supra. See also notes 347-48 & accompanying text infra.
338. See Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, supra note 267 (medical-legal screening
panels reduce claims by approximately 24.5%, id. at 215; medical-legal panels
estimated to cost approximately 40-60% of the cost of resolving a mid-range
severity case at law, id. at 277; arbitration estimated to require 55-85% of the
cost of a mid-range severity case at law, id.).
339. Some states not only admit the panel's finding but also presume that it is
correct. The party rejecting the panel's decision must therefore sustain the
burden of proving that the conclusion is incorrect. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JuD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-06(d) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
340. 360 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), a~fd, 367 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1979).
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but then refused to present any evidence to the panel. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the plaintiffs' failure
to offer any evidence to the panel amounted to non-performance of
a condition precedent in a malpractice action and subverted the
legislature's intent in creating the panel. However, this finding
was reversed on appeal, where the court concluded that while the
presentation of the claim was mandatory, the presentation of evidence was optional. Dismissal was deemed too harsh, since the
party who neglects to present evidence suffers the consequences
of having the panel's adverse finding admitted into evidence at the
trial. This was a sufficient sanction according to the
subsequent
34 1
court.

A contrary result was reached in Little v. Rosenthal,342 where
the court found that the malpractice statute required the plaintiff
to do more than simply plead facts constituting a cause of action to
the panel. According to this court, the plaintiff did not satisfy his
statutory burden of presenting evidence to the panel merely by
making a verbal offer of proof.
Unless the panel's findings are admissible, there would be little
incentive to settle.3 3 Merely admitting the panel's findings may
not be sufficient to effectuate the legislative intent. Allowing petitioners to present their claim to the panel while presenting little or
no evidence is a deliberate attempt to circumvent the Act. 344 Con341. However, the plaintiff's attorney may be able to explain the adverse finding of
the panel by simply stating to the jury that he presented no evidence to the
panel because the plaintiff desired to have a jury of his peers, not a panel of
physicians, evaluate the conduct of the health care provider. It is questionable whether the adverse conclusions of the panel would present any burden
in this situation.
342. 382 N.E.2d 1037 (Mass. 1978).
343. Several commentators have argued that the prejudical effect of admitting
these adverse findings may be virtually impossible to overcome. See Comment, supra note 1, at 681. But see note 341 supra. There is fear that if the
jurors give undue credence to these findings, the right to a meaningful trial
will be diminished. See, e.g., Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio
Op. 3d 164, 168, 355 N.E.2d 903, 908 (1976); Note, supra note 274, at 102. But in
view of the rather limited findings which the panel may return, see text accompanying notes 301-05 supra, it seems that most juries would not be unnecessarily prejudiced by the panel's conclusion. See notes 316-18 &
accompanying text supra. Compare this, however, with OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 2711.21(C) (Page Supp. 1978), which allows the court to review the
findings of the arbitration board before admitting them at trial. The findings
are admitted only after the court concludes that: (1) The findings of fact by
the arbitration board were not clearly erroneous; (2) The decision is in accordance with the applicable law; and (3) The procedures required for conducting the hearing and rendering the decision were followed fairly and
properly without prejudice to either party.
344. Herrera v. Doctor's Hosp., 360 So. 2d 1092, 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (dissenting opinion), affd, 367 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1979).
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sequently, the legislation should be amended to mandate that all
patients present both their claim and a reasonable amount of evidence which the party intends to present at trial. If on appeal the
court determines that there has not been a good faith effort to comply with these provisions, the action may be dismissed. Since one
purpose of the legislation is to assure the continuing availability of
medical care through prompt and efficient claims disposition, it is
not unreasonable to require good faith cooperation by the participants.
A final advantage of the Nebraska plan is that by enabling the
parties to call the panel members as expert witnesses at trial, the
plaintiffs are no longer at a distinct disadvantage due to the alleged
"conspiracy of silence." This "conspiracy" exists when health care
providers refuse to testify against their colleagues so that the patient is unable to gather any expert testimony.345 Allowing panel
members to be called as expert witness increases the likelihood of
settlement, since an adverse decision, particularly a unanimous
one, would indicate that the plaintiff will have difficulty finding an
expert witness to testify contrary to the panel's finding, thus limiting the plaintiff's chances of preiiailing at trial.34 6 On the contrary,
a favorable finding may exert sufficient pressure on the health care
provider to reevaluate his position, since the patient would have at
least two, and possibly three, qualified physicians to appear on his
behalf.
345. It is virtually impossible (except perhaps in those rare instances where the
health care provider's negligence is blatant) for a plaintiff to build a solid case
of malpractice without expert medical testimony. But patients often complain that "doctors rarely, and then only reluctantly, testify against each
other." MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 36. There is little hard, quantitative data to prove or disprove this theory, but several suggestions have
been offered as to why health care providers might be reluctant to testify in
malpractice cases: (1) Health care providers are reluctant to suffer loss of
time and income which are often caused by a court appearance; (2) Health
care providers are irritated by the time they must spend away from their patients; (3) Health care providers often resent and fear the probing cross-examination to which they are subjected. They are unprepared for frontal
attacks on their creditibility; (4) Health care providers experience difficulty
and frustration in explaining complex medical principles to lay persons; (5)
Health care providers are reluctant to injure friends and fellow health care
providers. There seems to be a shared feeling among health care providers
that "there but for the grace of God go I;" (6) Health care providers often feel
that the majority of malpractice claims are without merit. 1 LOUISELL & WLLuAms, supra note 78, 14.03, at 422-23. There is some indication, with the
increasing acceptance of national standards and a more cooperative response
from health care providers, that the "conspiracy of silence" may no longer
represent a significant problem. See MALPRACTicE REPORT, supra note 1, at
36-37. This may also be due to the increased availability of medical review
panel members to testify.
346. Comment, supra note 25, at 1462.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:363

It may be too early to reach any definite conclusions as to the
value and effectiveness of the Nebraska pre-trial review panel.
However, with the exception of the noted deficiencies, Nebraska's
review panel appears to be designed to be equitable yet inexpensive and efficient. Nevertheless, it is unclear what effect this panel
will have on reducing the amount of malpractice litigation reaching
the courts. Initial reports from other states indicate that the plaintiffs generally pursue their claims in spite of panel rulings
favorable to the defendants. 347 This in turn results in unwarranted
delays and expenses for both the plaintiffs and defendants in the
malpractice action.34 And although medical malpractice screening panels have survived initial constitutional challenges, 349 this
may represent only a temporary victory in what may be a prolonged battle. The Missouri Supreme Court 35 0 recently decided
that their screening panel was unconstitutional, and similar assaults are being staged in numerous other states. 35 1 The prognosis
is not encouraging, but the experiences of other states should be
cautiously compared to Nebraska, since this state's malpractice
problem is not as serious as that in many other states. But in the
final analysis the ultimate success of such panels may depend
more on the degree of cooperation between the bar association and
the medical profession than any combination of tort law modifica352
tions.
347. NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1980, at 1, col. 4. This article also concludes that screening
panels in medical malpractice cases are "ill conceived, ineffective and invalid." Id. at 1.
348. Id. at 34. In Pennsylvania, for instance, panels have held hearings in only 14
of nearly 3,000 cases submitted to them since their creation in January 1976.
Id. In Maryland, 315 of 350 claims submitted to the pretrial screening panel
since July 1976 are still open, and most of those decided proceeded to trial
regardless of the panels verdict. Id. The explanations for these delays include underadministration, poorly conceived plans and bureaucratic entanglements. Id.
349. See note 310 supra.
350. See State ex rel. Cardinal Glennan Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d
107 (Mo. 1979) in which a minor and her parents sued a hospital and six physicians for professional negligence. The plaintiffs failed to first submit their
claim to the Professional Liability Review Board as required by Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 538.10-.80 (Vernon Supp. 1980), and the defendants petitioned the
court to dismiss the case for this reason. The court held that chapter 538,
under which any person having a malpractice claim against a health care provider must refer the claim to the review panel before filing an action in court
was unconstitutional since it imposed a procedure as a precondition to access
to the courts.
351. See NAT'L L.J., supra note 347, at 1.
352. See Comment, supra note 161, at 1193 n.105.
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IV.

THE TRUE CRISIS: MALPRACTICE

The immediate malpractice crisis has temporarily abated, since
adequate insurance is generally available for most health care
providers and premiums for this insurance are significantly lower
than during the crisis period. For instance, in Nebraska, the largest medical malpractice insurer was charging hospitals an average
of $737 per bed in July, 1976, but only $185 per bed in July, 1979. In
addition, the premiums for general practioners dropped from $737
a year to $456 a year over the same period.3 53 But these improvements cannot necessarily be attributed to tort reforms which took
place in the area of medical malpractice. The main reasons the
crisis has eased are the development of joint underwriting associations, patients' compensation funds and doctor-owned insurance
companies which have significantly increased the availability of
malpractice insurance; 354 the adverse publicity associated with
large verdicts; 355 an increase in the fees which health care providers charge their patients; 356 and the switch by the insurance companies from occurrence to claims-made policies. 3 57 The primary
focus of legislative efforts has been to control the losses and costs
associated with malpractice rather than to minimize the incidents
of malpractice.358 Unfortunately, these measures have come at the
patient's expense. And while these tort modifications may have
had a minimal effect in easing the crisis, they quite simply do not
reach the underlying problem-the occurrence of malpractice 3 59
Numerous studies indicate that there are many incidents of
malpractice that do not result in malpractice claims. One recent
353. Lincoln Journal, July 22, 1979, § B, at 1, col. 1. But see NAIC STuDY, supra
note 65, at 2 (from an analysis of 16,500 claims closed during a two year period
(June 1976 to June 1978), "it would appear that malpractice claim costs continue to rise."). Evidence also seems to indicate that these rate reductions
may be temporary, since "the number of medical malpractice claims in Nebraska increased substantially during 1978 and the first half of 1979.. .."
Omaha World Herald, Jan. 20, 1980, § B at 1, col. 1. Figures from St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Co., the major malpractice insurer in Nebraska indicate that in 1976, that company had 7.48 malpractice claims for every 100 of its
insured physicians in Nebraska; this figure dropped to six percent per 100
doctors in 1977, but increased to 7.31 in 1978 and 12.2% for the first six months
of 1979, Id.
354. See ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-10. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2837 to
-2839 (Reissue 1978) (Residual Malpractice Authority was created to write
medical malpractice liability insurance for those health care providers who
are unable to obtain coverage).
355. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10.
356. Id.
357. See note 89 supra.
358. See Comment, supra note 1, at 685-88.
359. ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 10, 12. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 68591.
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study found that only one incident of malpractice out of every ten
occurrences result in a malpractice claim, 360 while a second study
found that less than one-fifth of the incidents of malpractice result
in claims.3 61 In an extensive 1973 survey, two-fifths of the 1017 respondents participating in the survey stated that they, their
spouses or their dependants had experienced adverse medical
care within the past ten years. 362 Yet only thirty-seven respondents, or eight percent of the respondents reporting adverse experiences, indicated that legal advice was considered. 363 And one
HEW official estimates that as many as 700,000 medical injuries an364
nually may be the result of health care malpractice.
These studies provide some indication that the eventual solution to the medical malpractice problem lies not in altering the
malpractice litigation system, but in reducing incidents of malpractice. Long term solutions will result only when malpractice is recognized as the essence of the problem. Unfortunately, the
Nebraska Act treats malpractice litigation, not malpractice, as the
source of the problem.
V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE TRUE CRISIS
The Nebraska legislature has taken several steps designed to
improve the quality of health care which should ultimately have a
beneficial effect on the malpractice problem. First, the Commission on Medical Qualifications was created to monitor the conduct
360. MALPRACTICE DIG., Jan./Feb. 1979, at 4.
361. MALPRACTICE LIFELINE, June 30, 1978, at 1.
362. Peterson, supra note 44, at 668-75. These perceptions, however, do not establish that there was malpractice.
363. Id. at 674-75.
364. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 13 (Comm. Print 1975). In

addition to malpractice, many injuries result from unnecessary operations:
[S]ome studies indicate that there are from two to three million unnecessary operations performed each year, wholly apart from professional malpractice, which costs Americans between three and four
billion dollars.... These unnecessary operations also cause medical
injuries and deaths. The deaths caused by these unnecessary operations have been estimated at between 11,000 and 16,000 annually...
[I]t seems fair to conclude that over a million medical injuries and
many thousands of deaths caused by these injuries annually are the
product of either medical malpractice or unnecessary operations performed by physicians and other health care providers.
Witherspoon, supra note 3, at 442 n.115.1. See generally L IVAN, MEDICAL
NEMESIS: THE EXPROPRIATION OF HEALTH (1976); H. LEwIs & M. LEWIS, THE
MEDICAL OFFENDERS (1970). See also, Getting Ready for NationalHealth Insurance. Unnecessary Surgery, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigationsof the House Comm. on Interstateand Foreign Commerce,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 59-73 (1975) (testimony of Sidney Wolfe).
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of health care providers. 365 This commission hears complaints on
the activities or qualifications of any physician or surgeon licensed
to practice in Nebraska. 366 Commission members enjoy broad investigating powers 36 7 and civil immunity from "liability of any kind
based upon any act or omission while acting in the course of

[their] duties ... as such commission members ....",368 so that
they may freely investigate charges against medical personnel. if
the commission determines that the complaint has merit it must
submit the evidence to the Director of Health for a formal hearing.
The physician or surgeon may have his license revoked or he may
be subjected to other penalties for a variety of reasons. 369
This commission should certainly have a beneficial effect on the
delivery of health care, 370 and more importantly, it will serve as a
forum for patients to channel their grievances without initiating
causes of action in court. If the patient feels that he is not being
ignored, that someone is listening to and acting on his complaint,
this may ease many of the feelings of frustration and alienation,
37 1
feelings which often result in a suit.
Perhaps more importantly, the detailed data 72 collected for
365. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2848 (Reissue 1978). This commission consists of
two medical doctors (engaged in active practice in Nebraska and who have
practiced for at least 10 years) to be appointed by the Board of Examiners in
Medicine and Surgery; tvo members of the Nebraska Medical Association
who are designated by the Association and one physician appointed by the
governor. Id. § 44-2848(2).
366. Id. § 44-2851(2).
367. Id. § 44-2851(4).
368. Id. § 44-2853(4).
369. Id. § 44-2853(1)-(7). These reasons include:
(1) Willful disregard of or failure to perform his duties and obligations to a patient,
(2) Habitual intemperance;
(3) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(4) Gross negligent acts in performing his duties as a physician;
(5) A continued course of negligent conduct... ;
(6) Physical or mental disability materially affecting his ability to
perform his duties in a competent manner ....
Id.
370. But see Comment, supra note 1, at 686-87, in which the commentator concludes that measures such as Nebraska's Commission on Medical Qualifications
cannot be expected to contribute significantly to a reduction of malpractice. Rather than arising from incompetence, malpractice is
more often produced when a competent doctor makes a mistake or a
normally reliable procedure breaks down. Because medical incompetence is but an infrequent cause of malpractice, controlling it will
have only a limited influence on the number of claims that result.
(footnote omitted).
371. See MALPRAcTicE REPORT, supra note 1, at 84. See also notes 77-87 & accompanying text supra.
372. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2835 (Reissue 1978).
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this commission will prove invaluable in pinpointing the procedures and situations that result in malpractice.3 7 3 Whenever a
malpractice claim is settled or finally decided, the plaintiffs attorney and the health care provider must report the following information to the director of insurance: the nature of the claim; the
alleged injury and the damages asserted; the attorney's fees and
expenses incurred in connection with the claim or defense and the
amount of settlement or judgment. This report is then forwarded
to the Medical Qualifications Committee for their consideration
and action. 374 But to be fully effective this knowledge as to how,
when and where claims arise must be fully utilized after it is gathered.3 75 In order to develop an effective medical injury prevention
program, 376 this data on the frequency and causes of adverse medical incidents must be carefully analyzed, and appropriate measures must be designed to minimize potential future occurrences.
Procedures and circumstances giving rise to frequent malpractice
claims should be "isolated and analyzed to determine what therapeutic action should be undertaken to prevent malpractice and the
' 377
injuries it causes.
A second legislative provision (not included in the Nebraska
Malpractice Act) which should have a minimal effect in reducing
3 78
the incidents of malpractice is the hospital review committee.
This committee periodically reviews the quality of medical care
provided in the hospital in order to insure that the hospital staff
exercises a high standard of care and to promote the most efficient
379
use of the hospital facilities.
Unfortunately, the hospital review committee may not be able
to analyze effectively and remedy malpractice in the hospital,
since there is neither a systematic approach to analyzing the occurrences of malpractice nor any suggestion as to how such incidents may be resolved once they are discovered. Since the
majority of malpractice incidents occur in hospitals, 380 it is imperative that the legislature and the health care industry focus their
attention on developing a comprehensive medical injury prevention program. The hospital is certainly the best environment to
monitor injuries and initiate effective efforts to reduce adverse incidents. It is also essential that these programs be comprehensive:
373. See generally MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 45, 84; ABA
supra note 1, at 99-103.
374. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2835 (Reissue 1978).
375. Comment, supra note 1, at 687-88.
376. MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 61.
377. Comment, supra note 1, at 688.
378. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 71-2046 to -2048 (Reissue 1976).
379. Id. § 71-2046.
380. See MALPRACTICE REPORT, supra note 1, at 61.
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Injury prevention programs should focus on every potential source of
injury to patients, including medication errors, slips and falls, faulty medical equipment, inadequate supervision of personnel, break-downs in communication, unnecessary surgery, inadequate record-keeping, and other
sources of potential harm-whether or not related to negligent conduct.
As new and more sophisticated methods for preventing injuries are developed, they should be expanded to include medical mi'ur
38
p
physicians' offices and other non-institutional settings.

Florida, for example, has created an internal risk management
program in every hospital or facility providing in-house patient
care.382 This comprehensive program is designed to investigate
and analyze specific and general categories of adverse incidents
causing injuries to patients; to minimize the risk of further adverse
results; to analyze patient grievances relating to patient care and
the quality of medical services; and to develop an extensive incident reporting system. In addition, the legislation provides that
any "innovative approaches intended to reduce the frequency and
severity of medical malpractice and patient injury claims shall be
383
encouraged and their implementation and operation facilitated."
Potential problems can be avoided and effective programs developed based on individual experience in the patient care facilities
or institutions. This plan offers several distinct advantages.
First, the program attacks the malpractice problem at the outset with preventive measures such as the patient grievance mechanism. 384 If effectively administered, this device can respond to
patient grievances before they become claims. Second, in addition
to focussing on adverse injuries which can be attributed to medical
negligence, this plan attacks those procedures causing adverse results which may not be attributable to medical negligence. 385 This
will assist in improving those areas which potentially may result in
malpractice claims, although the injury itself is not caused by malpractice. Finally, this plan encourages the cooperation of all health
care personnel and patients in eliminating potential trouble areas,
so the quality of health care should improve while the number of
malpractice claims is reduced.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act may have been an
expedient solution to the malpractice crisis in the mid 1970's, but it
381.
382.
383.
384.

Id. (emphasis added).
FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 768.41 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Id. § 768.41(3).
For a discussion of patient grievance mechanisms, see MALPRACrCE REPORT,

supra note 1, at 83-87.
385. Principles and guidelines which are important in the success of hospital patient safety programs are found in ABA REPORT, supra note 1, at 118-26.
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should not be considered the ultimate solution.386 The legislation
significantly alters the malpractice litigation system at the patient's expense, but it provides very little in the way of long term
answers to the problem of medical malpractice. In contrast to
these sweeping reforms aimed at guaranteeing the availability of
malpractice insurance, very little has been done to minimize the
occurrence of malpractice.
Several provisions of the Act are troublesome, particularly
those which limit the recovery for the seriously injured patients,
impose a statute of limitations, and allow the court to review an
attorney's fees. Ultimately, however, truly remedial legislation
should focus on designing comprehensive programs to improve relations between health care providers and patients; to minimize
the occurrence of any incidents, whether or not attributed to malpractice, which may give rise to malpractice claims; and to encourage cooperation between health care providers, the legal
community and patients. The malpractice dike is plugged temporarily, but it seems unlikely that it will hold unless we begin addressing the source of the problem-the occurrence of malpractice.
David J. Dempsey '80

386. One recent insurance study of malpractice tort reform legislation in California indicates that this legislation may have increased claims, awards and settlements in that state. The downward trend in the amount of settlements and
verdicts in 1975 and 1976 (subsequent to passage of sweeping tort reform legislation in 1975) "dramatically reversed" in 1977 and 1978. MALPRACCE LiFEL-E, May 25, 1979, at 4. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 688-89
(malpractice legislation is "shortsighted and designed to have only a palliative effect upon the very serious problem of medical malpractice.... [T]he
potential for a future crisis, still exists, relatively unscratched by the recent
flood of legislation.").

